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IS PROTECTING AN EMPLOYEE’S RIGHT TO 
KNOWINGLY FILE FALSE EEOC CHARGES A 
NECESSARY EVIL? 
Lawrence D. Rosenthal*
          In addition to prohibiting workplace discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 protects: (1) employees who oppose an employer’s 
discriminatory employment practices, and (2) employees who participate 
in Title VII’s enforcement process. Thus, not only are employees 
protected from workplace discrimination based on particular traits, but 
they are also protected from retaliation if they attempt to vindicate their 
right to be free from workplace discrimination either internally with their 
employer or externally with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC). 
          When analyzing retaliation cases, courts agree on several 
principles. Most importantly, courts agree that the McDonnell-Douglas 
burden-shifting paradigm applies, which requires (1) the plaintiff to 
establish a prima facie case; (2) the employer to articulate a legitimate, 
non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action; and then (3) 
the plaintiff to demonstrate the employer’s articulated reason for the 
adverse employment action was pretext for the real reason: unlawful 
retaliation. 
          This Article will focus on the first part of this framework–the prima 
facie case. When establishing a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove: 
(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse 
employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action. This Article will 
focus on the first element of the prima facie case–protected activity. 
Specifically, the Article will address whether an employee who knowingly 
files a false discrimination charge with the EEOC (or who knowingly 
provides false testimony during the EEO process) engages in protected 
activity, or whether he loses protection if he engages in this type of 
deceptive behavior.   
 
 * Associate Dean for Academics and Professor of Legal Writing, Northern Kentucky 
University—Salmon P. Chase College of Law; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; LL.M., 
Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank his research assistant, Ms. 
Sarah Benedict, for all of the assistance she provided during the writing of this Article. 
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          This Article will argue that, despite the uneasy feeling courts might 
have protecting individuals who engage in this type of behavior, 
protecting these individuals might, in fact, be necessary. The reasons 
behind this pro-employee conclusion are the following: (1) Title VII’s 
language is broad and arguably requires this result; (2) the EEOC 
believes Title VII covers all employees who file EEOC charges and who 
testify in EEO proceedings; (3) providing this protection will not result 
in employees being able to guarantee themselves workplace tenure 
simply by filing EEOC charges; and (4) providing protection is 
consistent with Congress’s goals of providing access to Title VII’s 
remedial scheme and not wanting to dissuade employees from bringing 
legitimate discrimination claims or supporting other employees’ 
legitimate claims.  
          So, while it might seem wrong to protect employees who knowingly 
file false discrimination charges (or who knowingly provide false 
testimony in an EEO proceeding), there are several reasons why courts 
might just have to do that very thing. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In addition to prohibiting workplace discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin,1 Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 also protects employees who oppose their employers’ 
unlawful discriminatory practices and employees who participate in 
the statute’s enforcement process.2 Other federal anti-discrimination 
statutes also prohibit retaliation against employees who engage in 
similar activities.3 Thus, not only are employees protected from 
workplace discrimination based on particular traits, but they are also 
protected from employer retaliation if they attempt to vindicate their 
rights either internally with their employer or externally with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).4 
When analyzing retaliation claims, courts agree on several 
principles. One of the most important issues on which courts agree is 
that the McDonnell-Douglas5 burden-shifting paradigm applies to 
retaliation cases, and this paradigm requires the following: (A) the 
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; (B) the employer must then 
articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse 
employment action; and (C) then the plaintiff must demonstrate the 
employer’s articulated reason for the adverse employment action was 
pretext for the real reason: unlawful retaliation.6 
This Article will focus on the first part of this framework—the 
prima facie case. When establishing a prima facie case, a plaintiff must 
prove: (A) he engaged in a protected activity; (B) he suffered an 
adverse employment action; and (C) there was a causal connection 
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.7 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). 
 2. Id. § 2000e-3(a). 
 3. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2018); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discrimination based upon race, color, 
religion, sex, and national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting retaliation). 
 5. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 6. Id. at 801–04. 
 7. See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 88 (1st Cir. 2005); Calero-Cerezo v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004). Some courts list a fourth element—employer 
knowledge of the protected activity. See, e.g., Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 844 (2d 
Cir. 2013); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 578 (6th Cir. 2000). Although not all 
courts list this element, employer knowledge is critical; if an employer has no knowledge of a 
protected activity, it cannot have a retaliatory motive for the adverse employment action. See 
Noviello, 398 F.3d at 88 (explaining that in order for a plaintiff to show that he or she suffered an 
adverse employment action as a result of his or her conduct, it must necessarily be true that the 
defendant knew about the conduct). 
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This Article will address the first element of the prima facie case—
protected activity. Specifically, the Article will address whether an 
employee who knowingly files a false discrimination charge with the 
EEOC engages in protected activity, or whether he loses protection if 
he engages in that type of behavior.8 Despite the uneasy feeling courts 
might have protecting individuals who engage in this behavior, this 
Article will argue that protecting those individuals might, in fact, be 
necessary until Congress or the Supreme Court decides otherwise.9 
Part II of this Article describes Title VII’s relevant statutory 
language, addressing two types of activities the statute protects—
opposition and participation.10 Part III analyzes cases that have 
addressed the level of protection afforded to employees who 
knowingly file false charges or engage in other participation activity.11 
Finally, Part IV explains why courts might have to protect employees 
who engage in this behavior, despite the uneasy feeling doing so might 
create.12 
The reasons behind this pro-employee conclusion are the 
following: (A) Title VII’s language is broad and arguably requires this 
result;13 (B) the EEOC believes the participation clause covers all 
employees who file EEOC charges;14 (C) providing this protection 
 
 8. This Article will also address other types of “participation activity” such as providing 
testimony in an EEO proceeding. Filing EEOC charges and providing testimony in an EEO 
proceeding are protected under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and thus should receive the same level of protection. 
 9. Even when judges protect these activities, they have expressed concern over doing so. See, 
e.g., Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (acknowledging that 
protecting false and malicious claims might seem “unappealing” but ultimately concluding that not 
protecting them was a less desirable outcome). 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. Some of these cases addressed similar, but not identical, situations; 
however, those courts’ reasonings are also applicable to the filing of false charges. 
 12. See infra Part IV; see also supra note 9 (discussing judicial concern over protecting false 
and malicious claims). 
 13. See infra Section IV.A. 
 14. See infra Section IV.B. The EEOC does not, however, believe false or malicious charges 
should go without consequences: 
False or bad faith statements by either the employee or the employer should be taken 
into appropriate account by the factfinder, investigator, or adjudicator of the EEO 
allegation when weighing credibility, ruling on procedural matters, deciding on the scope 
of the factfinding process, and deciding if the claim has merit. It is the Commission’s 
position, however, that an employer can be liable for retaliation if it takes it upon itself 
to impose consequences for actions taken in the course of participation. 
Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-retaliation-
and-related-issues. 
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will not result in bad employees being able to guarantee themselves 
workplace tenure by filing EEOC charges;15 and (D) providing 
protection is consistent with Congress’s goals of providing access to 
Title VII’s remedial scheme and not wanting to dissuade employees 
from pursuing legitimate discrimination claims and/or testifying in 
connection with other employees’ legitimate claims.16 
Now, and consistent with the canon of statutory construction 
requiring courts to look first at statutory language when interpreting a 
statute,17 this Article will address Title VII’s relevant language. 
II.  TITLE VII’S RELEVANT LANGUAGE 
As noted earlier, Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes 
contain anti-retaliation provisions that protect employees who engage 
in EEO activities.18 These activities include, but are not limited to, 
lodging internal complaints, filing charges with the EEOC, and 
testifying in someone else’s EEO proceeding.19 Specifically, Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment, . . . because he has opposed any practice made 
an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or 
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 
or hearing under this subchapter.20 
In this provision, there are two clauses that provide protection: 
there is the “opposition clause” (which prohibits retaliation “because 
[a plaintiff] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
 
 15. See infra Section IV.C. 
 16. See infra Section IV.D. 
 17. See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010); Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018); see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2018) (prohibiting retaliation against an individual for making a claim or 
assisting in an investigation under the ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (prohibiting discrimination 
against an individual for making a claim or assisting in an investigation under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act). 
 19. See Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra note 14. The Supreme 
Court has also decided that answering an employer’s questions regarding another individual’s 
internal EEO complaint qualifies as opposition. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 
Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276–78 (2009). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
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practice by this subchapter”),21 and there is the “participation clause” 
(which prohibits retaliation “because [a plaintiff] has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”).22 Although each 
clause provides protection, the types of activities protected under each 
clause, and the scope of the protection, are different.23 
When deciding whether an employee’s actions qualify as 
opposition or participation, some courts invoke the opposition clause 
when an EEOC charge has not yet been filed,24 and they invoke the 
participation clause once a charge has been filed.25 Regardless of how 
courts make this distinction, this distinction is critical because most 
courts provide more protection under the participation clause.26 As a 
result, many employees try to seek protection under the participation 
clause, while many employers try to characterize employees’ activities 
as falling under the less protective opposition clause.27 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he scope 
of protection for activity falling under the participation clause is broader than for activity falling 
under the opposition clause.” (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 
n.4 (4th Cir. 1998))); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 
1989) (noting the distinction between participation and opposition is “significant because federal 
courts have generally granted less protection for opposition than for participation in enforcement 
proceedings”). But see Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding 
that the levels of protection are the same under both clauses). 
 24. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 
(11th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 25. Id. (noting the participation clause “protects proceedings and activities which occur in 
conjunction with or after the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC; it does not include 
participating in an employer’s internal, in-house investigation, conducted apart from a formal 
charge with the EEOC”). The EEOC has taken a different approach, stating: 
The Commission and the Solicitor General have long taken the view that participation 
and opposition have some overlap, in that raising complaints, serving as a voluntary or 
involuntary witness, or otherwise participating in an employer’s internal complaint or 
investigation process, whether before or after an EEOC or Fair Employment Practices 
Agency (FEPA) charge has been filed, is covered under the broad protections of the 
participation clause, although it is also covered as “opposition.” 
Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra note 14. 
 26. See, e.g., Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151; Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259 n.4; see also Vasconcelos 
v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Accusations made in the context of charges before 
the Commission are protected by statute; charges made outside of that context are made at the 
accuser’s peril.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Total Sys. Servs., 221 F.3d at 1174 (noting that the EEOC argued the employee’s 
activity fell under the participation clause, while the employer argued the activity fell under the 
opposition clause). 
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A.  The Opposition Clause 
The first type of activity Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision 
protects is “opposition” activity.28 The scope of this protection is 
broad, protecting activities such as making Title VII complaints to 
employers, refusing to follow an employer’s order that violates Title 
VII, and engaging in other activities that “oppose” an employer’s 
unlawful discriminatory policies.29 Although the opposition clause’s 
protection is broad, it is typically less broad than the participation 
clause’s protection.30 The critical difference between these provisions 
is that, to be protected, the opposition activity must be based on a 
reasonable, good-faith belief the employer is violating, or has violated, 
Title VII.31 And, as will be addressed, most jurisdictions do not apply 
this same standard to the participation clause, providing almost 
unlimited protection for those who engage in participation activities.32 
One of the most common types of opposition activity is lodging 
internal discrimination complaints.33 As previously noted, for those 
complaints to be protected, the employee’s belief the employer is 
violating, or has violated, Title VII must be a reasonable, good-faith 
belief.34 If an employee’s belief of unlawful activity is not a 
reasonable, good-faith belief, the opposition clause will not protect the 
 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018). 
 29. See Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance
/questions-and-answers-enforcement-guidance-retaliation-and-related-issues. As noted supra note 
25, the EEOC believes lodging internal complaints can qualify as participation. Courts have 
rejected that approach, see, e.g., Total Sys. Servs., 221 F.3d at 1174, however, after Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), there is a legitimate argument that internal complaints 
should qualify as participation. In Faragher, the Court imposed a requirement that Title VII 
plaintiffs must, in certain circumstances, first notify the employer of the alleged discrimination. Id. 
at 807–08. As a result, internal complaints have essentially become part of the EEO process and 
could qualify as participation. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument in Total Sys. Servs., 221 
F.3d at 1174 n.3. In her dissent from the denial of rehearing of Total Sys. Servs., Judge Barkett 
acknowledged this argument. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 240 F.3d 
899, 903–04 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 30. See, e.g., Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151 (quoting Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259 n.4). 
 31. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (utilizing a reasonable, good-
faith-belief test when deciding an opposition case). 
 32. See, e.g., Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151–52 (noting the participation clause provides more 
protection than the opposition clause). But see Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (holding both clauses provide the same level of protection). 
 33. See Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, 
supra note 29. As was stated earlier, the Supreme Court has decided answering an employer’s 
questions regarding another individual’s internal EEO complaint also qualifies as opposition. 
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276–78 (2009). 
 34. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71. 
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employee.35 As a result, employees must be careful when deciding 
whether to lodge internal discrimination complaints, as doing so 
without what a court ultimately determines is a reasonable, good-faith 
belief of unlawful activity could result in an adverse employment 
action without a remedy.36 If, however, the employee files an EEOC 
charge (activity that falls under the participation clause), that 
employee will most likely receive greater protection.37 The Article 
will now address the participation clause. 
B.  The Participation Clause 
The second type of activity the anti-retaliation provision protects 
is “participation” activity.38 The scope of this protection is supposed 
to be very broad (most courts believe this provision’s protections are 
more broad than the opposition clause’s protections),39 and the clause 
protects actions such as filing EEOC charges, testifying in Title VII 
proceedings, and assisting other employees in their Title VII 
proceedings.40 For reasons that will be discussed throughout this 
Article, the protection offered by this clause is quite broad, which is 
why plaintiffs try to cast their activity as participation rather than 
opposition whenever it is possible for them to do so.41 
The biggest difference between these two clauses is that while all 
courts agree opposition activities must be based on a reasonable, good-
faith belief the employer is violating, or has violated, Title VII,42 
courts are split as to whether that same standard applies to 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the 
Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation 
Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1142–44 (2007). 
 37. Some employees, however, might lose a subsequent lawsuit for not bringing the alleged 
harassment to the employer’s attention prior to filing an EEOC charge. See Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018); see also Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance 
on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra note 29 (explaining what the participation clause protects). 
 39. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 41. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 
1174–76 (11th Cir. 2000) (disagreeing with the EEOC’s argument that the at-issue activity fell 
under the participation clause), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 42. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (applying the reasonable, 
good-faith-belief standard to an opposition case). 
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participation activities.43 Courts that do not limit the participation 
clause do so because of the participation clause’s language, the 
EEOC’s position on this issue, and for policy reasons.44 Courts that do 
apply the reasonable, good-faith-belief standard to participation cases 
do so as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark County 
School District v. Breeden45 (although that case involved opposition, 
not participation)46 and for policy reasons.47 
This Article will address an issue regarding the scope of the 
participation clause—whether an employee who knowingly engages 
in false participation activity such as filing a false EEOC charge 
receives protection. Courts that use the reasonable, good-faith-belief 
standard for participation cases reject this type of claim;48 however, 
other courts have reached a different conclusion regarding whether the 
participation clause covers knowingly false participation activities.49 
The Article will now address how the courts have treated this issue. 
III.  THE SPLIT REGARDING KNOWINGLY ENGAGING IN FALSE 
PARTICIPATION ACTIVITIES 
As previously noted, some courts protect employees who 
knowingly engage in false participation activities.50 These courts do 
so for several reasons, including the participation clause’s language,51 
the EEOC’s position on the issue,52 the belief that doing so will not 
provide workplace tenure for bad employees,53 and because Title VII’s 
 
 43. Compare Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
reasonable, good-faith-belief standard applies to all retaliation claims), with Total Sys. Servs., 221 
F.3d at 1174–76 (noting different levels of protection under the opposition clause and the 
participation clause). 
 44. See infra Section III.A. 
 45. 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
 46. Id. at 270. For a thorough discussion of Breeden and the participation clause, see Lawrence 
D. Rosenthal, Reading Too Much into What the Court Doesn’t Write: How Some Federal Courts 
Have Limited Title VII’s Participation Clause’s Protections After Clark County School District v. 
Breeden, 83 WASH. L. REV. 345 (2008). 
 47. See, e.g., Mattson, 359 F.3d at 890–91; see also infra Section III.B (discussing court 
decisions and policy reasons for not extending the participation clause protection). 
 48. See, e.g., Mattson, 359 F.3d at 892. 
 49. See infra Section III.A (discussing cases that have granted broad protection under the 
participation clause). Some of these cases did not reach this specific issue, and some specifically 
declined to address it; nonetheless, because these courts provided protection under similar 
circumstances, those courts’ reasoning could apply to this situation. See id. 
 50. Several of those cases will be discussed in this Section. 
 51. See infra Section IV.A and cases cited therein. 
 52. See infra Section IV.B and cases cited therein. 
 53. See infra Section IV.C and cases cited therein. 
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purpose and structure support broad protection under the participation 
clause.54 Other courts, however, have been less inclined to provide 
protection under these circumstances, believing Congress could not 
have intended such a result and that the Supreme Court’s Breeden 
decision applies to participation activities.55 This part will provide 
examples of cases that have addressed the scope of the participation 
clause’s protection; the first section will discuss cases where the court 
adopted a pro-employee position, and the second section will discuss 
cases where the court adopted a pro-employer approach. 
A.  Courts that Have Taken a Pro-Employee Position 
Although it might seem odd to protect employees who knowingly 
engage in false participation activities, several courts have leaned in 
that direction.56 These courts did so for a variety of reasons, including 
Title VII’s language, the EEOC’s position regarding this issue, and 
several policy reasons.57 These pro-employee cases, at both the 
appellate level and trial level, will now be addressed. 
The opinion on which most courts rely for the proposition that the 
participation clause protects almost all participation activity is Pettway 
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.58 The question the court answered in 
Pettway was the following: “[W]hether a charge filed pursuant to 
[Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision] prohibits an employer from 
discharging an employee for having made false statements in a request 
for reconsideration of his case before the [EEOC].”59 The district court 
determined the plaintiff’s statements were not protected, but the Fifth 
Circuit reversed.60 
In Pettway, the plaintiff filed a charge alleging racial 
discrimination.61 The EEOC dismissed the charge, believing the 
employer did not violate Title VII.62 After the plaintiff received the 
EEOC’s determination, the EEOC informed the plaintiff he could 
 
 54. See infra Section IV.D and cases cited therein. 
 55. See infra Section III.B and cases cited therein. 
 56. See supra note 9. Those cases will be discussed in this Section. 
 57. See infra Section III.A. 
 58. 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969). As discussed below, the pro-employee cases refer to Pettway 
for the assertion that the participation clause’s protection is very broad. See Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t 
Div., 170 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1006 n.18). 
 59. Pettway, 411 F.2d at 999–1000. 
 60. Id. at 1000. 
 61. Id. at 1001. 
 62. Id. 
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submit additional information, and it was that submission the plaintiff 
claimed the participation clause protected.63 In that submission, the 
plaintiff suggested there was some type of cover-up or bribery 
between the EEOC and the employer.64 Soon after the plaintiff 
submitted this document, his employer discharged him.65 Predictably, 
the plaintiff filed another charge, this time alleging retaliation.66 
After addressing a preliminary issue, the court addressed Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s scope.67 The employer argued the 
plaintiff’s letter was not protected because it “constitute[d] a false and 
malicious accusation that [the employer] bribed or improperly 
influenced federal officers in the exercise of their official duties[,]”68 
and because of this, the employer’s decision to terminate the plaintiff 
was lawfully based on the plaintiff’s knowing and malicious libelous 
statements.69 The plaintiff argued the statements were protected, 
regardless of their truth.70 The lower court found the statements to be 
false, but the court was not certain whether the statements were 
motivated by malice.71 Regardless, the lower court ruled the 
termination was justified.72 As noted earlier, the Fifth Circuit 
reversed.73 
The Fifth Circuit started by noting the following regarding the 
participation clause’s purpose: “In unmistakable language[,] it is to 
protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by Congress to 
protect his rights. The Act will be frustrated if the employer may 
unilaterally determine the truth or falsity of charges and take 
independent action.”74 The court also focused on the importance of 
allowing employees to file EEOC charges without fear of retaliation.75 
The court stated the following: 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1001 n.5. 
 65. Id. at 1002. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1003. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1003–04. 
 71. Id. at 1004. 
 72. Id. The EEOC found the plaintiff’s statements were protected because they were made in 
the exercise of his right to complain to the EEOC and to avail himself of the Title VII process. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1000. 
 74. Id. at 1005. 
 75. Id. 
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The burden of enforcement rests on the individual through 
his suit in Federal District Court. But charges must first have 
been filed with EEOC. Consequently, the filing of charges 
and the giving of information by employees is essential to the 
Commission’s administration of Title VII, the carrying out 
of the congressional policy embodied in the Act[,] and the 
invocation of the sole sanction of Court compulsion through 
employee instituted suit.76  
The court noted employee participation was “essential” and 
should be protected.77 Relying on NLRB v. Burnup and Sims, Inc.78—
and comparing an employee to David and an employer to Goliath—
the court stated “[a] protected activity acquires a precarious status if 
innocent employees can be discharged while engaging in it, even 
though the employer acts in good faith.”79 The court also noted that 
“protection must be afforded to those who seek the benefit of statutes 
designed by Congress to equalize employer and employee in matters 
of employment.”80 
Realizing there must be a balance between an employer’s right 
not to be damaged by “maliciously libelous statements” and an 
employee’s right to be free from discrimination, the court struck that 
balance in the employee’s favor.81 The court held: 
We hold that where, disregarding the malicious material 
contained in a charge (or petition for reconsideration, or other 
communication with EEOC sufficient for EEOC purposes, or 
in a proceeding before EEOC) the charge otherwise satisfies 
the liberal requirements of a charge, the charging party is 
exercising a protected right under the Act. He may not be 
discharged for such writing. The employer may not take it on 
itself to determine the correctness or consequences of it. Nor 
may the court either sustain any employer disciplinary action 
or deny relief because of the presence of such malicious 
material.82 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 379 U.S. 21 (1964). 
 79. Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1005 (quoting Burnup, 379 U.S. at 23). 
 80. Id. at 1006. 
 81. Id. at 1007. 
 82. Id. 
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The court then concluded the plaintiff’s communication with the 
EEOC was protected even though there was material that was 
probably false and/or malicious.83 Elaborating, the court noted a 
plaintiff is not “stripped of . . . protection” because of those 
allegations, and as long as the plaintiff “says enough,” he cannot be 
subjected to retaliation.84 Because the employee was terminated 
because of the contents of the communication with the EEOC, the 
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.85 
The Fourth Circuit has also acknowledged the participation 
clause’s protection is very broad.86 In Glover v. South Carolina Law 
Enforcement Division,87 the plaintiff was fired after giving deposition 
testimony in another individual’s EEO proceeding.88 The problem, 
from the employer’s perspective, was that the plaintiff’s testimony 
was not only unrelated to the other employee’s case, but it was also 
critical of the office for which the plaintiff had worked prior to her 
employment with the defendant.89 The plaintiff accused her previous 
employer of mismanagement, destruction of documents, inappropriate 
behavior, and discrimination.90 This testimony was not related to the 
case for which the plaintiff was being deposed, and when the “target” 
of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony heard about it, he reported it to 
the plaintiff’s then-current employer.91 Soon thereafter, the plaintiff 
was removed from her position, and one of the reasons given was that 
her deposition testimony “demonstrated poor judgment.”92 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1007–08. 
 86. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). Although the court 
provided broad protection, it did state it was not answering whether a charge must be filed in good 
faith to receive protection. Id. at 415 n.2. In a pre-Glover, unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit 
relied on Pettway and stated, “While we may sympathize with the employer having to deal with an 
employee who has made conflicting and contradictory statements in an important investigation, the 
employee is protected from discharge because of his statements if they are made in connection with 
an investigation, proceeding or hearing under Title VII.” Arvinger v. Mayor of Balt. City, No. 88-
2203, 1990 WL 2198, at *8 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1990). 
 87. 170 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 88. Id. at 412. Although Glover involved a plaintiff who testified in another employee’s 
lawsuit (and did not file her own EEOC charge), both activities fall under the participation clause 
and should receive the same level of protection. Id. at 413–14. 
 89. Id. at 412. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 413. 
 92. Id. 
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The plaintiff filed a retaliation claim, and the district court granted 
the employer’s motion for summary judgment.93 The court decided the 
employer terminated the plaintiff because of her testimony, but that 
her testimony was not protected because it was “unresponsive, 
uncompelled, and gratuitous.”94 Therefore, because of the substance 
of the plaintiff’s testimony, the lower court decided she had not 
engaged in protected activity.95 
On appeal, the defendant asked the court to apply a 
reasonableness test when analyzing participation activities, which is 
what that court had done when analyzing opposition activities.96 The 
defendant also asked the court to find the plaintiff’s testimony 
unreasonable and therefore not protected.97 The court rejected the 
invitation to adopt a reasonableness test for participation activities, 
basing this decision on both the text and purpose of Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision.98 
With respect to Title VII’s text, the court noted the following: 
“Reading a reasonableness test into . . . [the] participation clause 
would do violence to the text of that provision and would undermine 
the objectives of Title VII.”99 Elaborating on the statutory language, 
the court stated: 
The plain language of the participation clause itself 
forecloses us from improvising such a reasonableness test. 
The clause forbids retaliation against an employee who “has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner” in a protected proceeding. [The plaintiff] was fired 
because she “testified” in a Title VII deposition. The term 
“testify” has a plain meaning: “[t]o bear witness” or “to give 
evidence as a witness.”100 
Because the statutory language in no way limited protection, the 
court was unwilling to read limiting language into it.101 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 413–14. 
 98. Id. at 414. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (first quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); and then quoting Testify, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (6th ed.1990)). 
 101. Id. 
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Next, relying on Pettway, the court noted participation plaintiffs 
are afforded “exceptionally broad protection.”102 And when referring 
back to Title VII’s language, the court noted there is nothing in that 
language that limits the participation clause’s reach; in fact, the court 
believed Congress’s use of the phrase “in any manner” demonstrated 
just the opposite—that the participation clause’s protection “is meant 
to sweep broadly.”103 Wrapping up its analysis of the statutory 
language, the court noted: “Congress could not have carved out in 
clearer terms this safe harbor from employer retaliation. A 
straightforward reading of the statute’s unrestrictive language leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title VII 
proceeding is protected against punitive employer action.”104 
Next, the court addressed the participation clause’s purpose, 
which is to “[m]aintain[] unfettered access to statutory remedial 
mechanisms.”105 Because participation is critical to Title VII’s 
enforcement, individuals must be comfortable participating in the 
enforcement process.106 The court noted: “If a witness in a Title VII 
proceeding were secure from retaliation only when her testimony met 
some slippery reasonableness standard, she would surely be less than 
forth-coming. It follows that the application vel non of the 
participation clause should not turn on the substance of the 
testimony.”107 
The court then cited Pettway again, noting that “[a] protected 
activity acquires a precarious status if innocent employees can be 
discharged while engaging in it, even though the employer acts in 
good faith.”108 Concluding that point, the court noted “Congress has 
determined that some irrelevant and even provocative testimony must 
be immunized so that Title VII proceedings will not be chilled. It is 
not for this court to overturn that judgment.”109 
Next, the court addressed the employer’s argument that such a 
broad interpretation would prevent an employer from ever terminating 
 
 102. Id. (quoting Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
 103. Id. (first quoting Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997); and 
then citing United States v. Wildes, 120 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
 104. Id. As noted earlier, the participation clause covers EEOC charges as well as testimony 
given during a Title VII proceeding. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018). 
 105. Glover, 170 F.3d at 414 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (quoting Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
 109. Id. 
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an employee who participates in EEO activity.110 The court rejected 
that argument, observing that employers can still fire employees who 
participate in EEO proceedings; they simply cannot fire those 
employees because they participate in those proceedings.111 
Employers can still discipline employees, so long as their motive is 
not a retaliatory one.112 The court held: “[w]e merely hold, in 
accordance with the statute’s specific text, that an employer may not 
fire an employee because of her testimony in a Title VII 
proceeding.”113 
The court then addressed the defendant’s additional arguments, 
but it rejected all of them.114 The court opined that imposing a 
reasonableness standard (1) “would lead the federal courts into a 
morass of collateral litigation in employment discrimination cases”; 
(2) would make witnesses unwilling to provide accurate information 
during depositions; and (3) would lead to discovery disputes that 
would ultimately waste individual and judicial resources.115 
Finally, the court distinguished the cases upon which the 
employer relied.116 The court did so by noting those cases involved the 
opposition clause rather than the participation clause, and that “the 
scope of protection for activity falling under the participation clause is 
broader than for activity falling under the opposition clause.”117 
According to the court, the “unambiguous and specific” language of 
the participation clause does not require any balancing and provides 
extremely broad protection.118 After rejecting the defendant’s other 
arguments (for reasons not relevant to this Article), the court reversed 
and remanded.119 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (citing Jackson v. St. Joseph State Hosp., 840 F.2d 1387, 1390–91 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
 113. Id. at 414–15. 
 114. Id. at 415. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th Cir. 
1998)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 415–16. Judge Williams argued that once the plaintiff started the attacks unrelated 
to the pending litigation, she was no longer protected. Id. at 416 (Williams, J., dissenting). Since 
Glover, at least one court within the Fourth Circuit expressed its belief the Fourth Circuit would 
reject a reasonableness standard for participation activities. See Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., No. 
WMN-09-2855, 2013 WL 3934013, at *10–11 (D. Md. July 29, 2013) (expressing its belief that 
“the Fourth Circuit would follow the clear majority rule and not require participation clause 
plaintiffs to establish reasonable belief in the merits of their underlying charge or complaint”). 
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Another case supporting broad protection for participation 
activity is Wyatt v. City of Boston.120 In Wyatt, the plaintiff alleged his 
former employer retaliated against him for opposing what he thought 
was sex discrimination and for filing a charge with the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination (the state equivalent of the 
EEOC).121 The lower court dismissed the complaint for failure to state 
a claim, but the First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded.122 
Although the First Circuit was unsure regarding the nature of the 
complaint, it concluded the plaintiff was alleging Title VII 
retaliation.123 
Although courts have relied on Wyatt for the proposition that the 
participation clause provides almost unlimited protection,124 the 
opinion provides only thin analysis.125 Specifically, the court first 
noted the difference between opposition activity and participation 
activity, and while addressing participation activity, the court stated 
the following: “there is nothing in [the participation clause’s] wording 
requiring that the charges be valid, nor even an implied requirement 
that they be reasonable.”126 The First Circuit relied on Sias v. City 
Demonstration Agency127 and on Pettway, as well as on Larson’s 
employment discrimination treatise.128 Ultimately, the court 
determined the plaintiff could, possibly, prove facts that would allow 
recovery, and therefore, the lower court had erroneously dismissed the 
complaint.129 
The Eleventh Circuit has also opined, at least in passing, that the 
participation clause’s reach is very broad.130 Although ultimately 
deciding the employee engaged in opposition activity, the court in 
Total System Services, Inc., noted the following: “[e]ven if false 
statements made in the context of an EEOC charge (per the 
participation clause) are protected and cannot be grounds for dismissal 
 
 120. 35 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 121. Id. at 14. 
 122. Id. at 14, 16. 
 123. Id. at 14–16. 
 124. See, e.g., Booth v. Pasco Cnty., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1201 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
 125. See Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15–16. 
 126. Id. at 15. 
 127. 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 128. Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15–16. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174–76 (11th 
Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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or discipline, this extreme level of protection for untruth is not 
afforded to false statements made under the opposition clause.”131 
When addressing the difference between participation and opposition, 
the court noted the participation clause’s broad level of protection: 
The statutory retaliation provision has two distinct 
components. Both offer employees some protection, but that 
these two components should offer two different levels of 
protection is consistent with the plain reading and purposes 
of the statute. The participation clause includes activity done 
in connection with proceedings conducted by the federal 
government and its agencies: an employee has invoked the 
jurisdiction of the federal government through its agency, the 
EEOC. And we have held that expansive protection is 
available for these adjudicative kinds of proceedings run by 
the government.132 
Thus, even though the plaintiff ultimately lost, the court did 
emphasize the participation clause’s broad protection.133 
Another court that emphasized the participation clause’s breadth 
was the Tenth Circuit.134 In Vaughn, the court rejected the limited 
interpretation the employer suggested and decided the plaintiff 
engaged in protected activity when she disclosed unredacted 
documents to the EEOC, which violated company policy and also 
possibly state and federal law.135 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, 
however, the court also decided her actions constituted a legitimate, 
non-retaliatory reason for her discharge,136 and because the plaintiff 
 
 131. Id. at 1175 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (first citing Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe 
Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969); and then citing Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 
(9th Cir. 1990)). 
 132. Id. at 1175–76 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007). 
 133. Id.; see also Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 
1989) (agreeing with Pettway that the participation clause provides broad protections) (involving 
state equivalent to Title VII). 
 134. See Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 135. Id. at 1152, 1153 n.4. 
 136. Id. at 1154. The court acknowledged that although participation is almost always 
protected, the employer can terminate the employee for that activity if it violates a company rule. 
Id. at 1152 n.3. The court noted: 
Although the participation clause may be nearly absolute in theory, it may seldom be 
absolute in fact. When an employee violates an employer’s policies, or for that matter 
the law, it will often be the case that the employer can assert a legitimate, non-retaliatory 
reason for taking an adverse employment action against the employee. And unless the 
employee can show that this reason was a pretext for retaliation, the employee will fail 
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could not prove pretext, the court affirmed the defendant’s summary 
judgment.137 
United States District Courts have also addressed the 
participation clause’s breadth.138 For example, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled in favor of an 
employee who brought a retaliation claim under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act.139 In Calhoun v. EPS Corp.,140 the 
plaintiff’s employer terminated her fifteen days after she filed a 
“meritless EEO complaint.”141 The EEOC found reasonable cause to 
believe the plaintiff was retaliated against for challenging the 
employer’s discriminatory practices, and that “retaliatory animus was 
the primary motivating factor for [her] discharge.”142 
After addressing the plaintiff’s substantive ADEA claim, the 
court addressed her retaliation claim.143 The court acknowledged this 
case presented a strange occurrence—an employment discrimination 
case in which the plaintiff prevails on a motion for summary 
judgment.144 The reason for this outcome was the direct evidence of 
retaliation—the employer conceded it terminated the plaintiff because 
she filed the EEO complaint.145 The employer believed the plaintiff 
knowingly filed a false complaint, and because of this, the employer 
believed it could terminate her for exercising bad judgment, violating 
 
to meet her burden under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Indeed, 
such a circumstance occurs in this case. 
Id. Thus, even though the plaintiff proved she engaged in protected activity, the court found that 
activity to be an acceptable reason for her termination. Id. at 1153–54. 
 137. Id. at 1155. For another case that adopted a broad view of the participation clause, see 
Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 138. See infra discussion remaining in Section III.A. 
 139. Calhoun v. EPS Corp., 36 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2014), vacated in part, No. 
13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 12799080 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014). ADEA retaliation cases are analyzed 
the same way as Title VII retaliation cases. See, e.g., Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 
462, 465 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We approach [the plaintiff’s] age-based retaliatory discharge claim in the 
same way as retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”). 
 140. 36 F. Supp. 3d 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2014), vacated in part, No. 13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 
12799080 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014). 
 141. Id. at 1348–49. 
 142. Id. at 1349. 
 143. Id. at 1353. 
 144. Id. at 1354. The court later granted the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, deciding a 
genuine issue of material fact existed. Calhoun v. EPS Corp., No. 13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 12799080, 
at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014). Nonetheless, on reconsideration, the court noted the participation 
clause grants “near-absolute” protection. Id. 
 145. Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1354–55. 
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company policy regarding filing accurate reports, and risking the loss 
of a government contract.146 The court rejected this position.147 
After addressing the evidence of retaliation, the court addressed 
the protection afforded by the statute.148 The court first noted “making 
an EEO complaint is absolutely protected activity.”149 It also 
mentioned that “[e]ven filing a false EEO complaint is protected 
conduct.”150 Relying on Pettway, the court noted the participation 
clause’s protection is “nearly absolute.”151 The court also relied on the 
Second Circuit’s statement in Deravin v. Kerik152 that the participation 
clause “is expansive and seemingly contains no limitations.”153 
Finally, relying on Total Systems Services, Inc., the court stated: 
“Importantly, that near-absolute protection covers even false 
complaints. As the Eleventh Circuit has held: even ‘false statements 
made in the context of an EEOC charge . . . are protected and cannot 
be grounds for dismissal or discipline . . . .’”154 Thus, the court 
adopted a broad interpretation of the participation clause, and 
consistent with Pettway, the court was unwilling to allow the employer 
to determine the merits of the employee’s EEO complaint.155 
The court then relied on the EEOC Compliance Manual.156 It 
quoted the following passage from the Manual: 
The anti-discrimination statutes do not limit or condition in 
any way the protection against retaliation for participating in 
the charge process. While the opposition clause applies only 
to those who protest practices that they reasonably and in 
good faith believe are unlawful, the participation clause 
applies to all individuals who participate in the statutory 
complaint process. Thus, courts have consistently held that a 
respondent is liable for retaliating against an individual for 
filing an EEOC charge regardless of the validity or 
 
 146. Id. at 1354. 
 147. Id. at 1354–61. 
 148. Id. at 1356. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (citing Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
 152. 335 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 153. Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (citing Deravin, 335 F.3d at 203). 
 154. Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., 
Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1356–57. 
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reasonableness of the charge. To permit an employer to 
retaliate against a charging party based on its unilateral 
determination that the charge was unreasonable or 
otherwise unjustified would chill the rights of all individuals 
protected by the anti-discrimination statutes.157 
And after concluding that the plaintiff’s EEO complaint was 
analogous to an EEOC charge, the court decided she would receive 
protection.158 The court rejected the employer’s invitation to use a 
reasonable, good-faith-belief test, concluding such a test applies only 
to opposition cases.159 As a result of this legal conclusion and direct 
evidence of retaliation, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment.160 Only the issue of damages remained.161 
Another district court opinion providing broad protection under 
the participation clause comes from the District of Columbia.162 Egei 
v. Johnson163 involved a plaintiff who filed false sexual harassment 
charges.164 The court framed the issue as being “whether an employer 
may lawfully fire an employee for making false or malicious 
accusations during the course of Equal Employment Opportunity 
(‘EEO’) proceedings.”165 The court decided the answer was “no,” and 
that the participation clause protects employees who engage in this 
activity.166 In denying the employer’s motion to dismiss (or in the 
alternative, summary judgment), the court stated “Title VII’s 
participation clause protects an employee from adverse employment 
action taken on the basis of the substance of her testimony in a Title 
VII EEO proceeding.”167 
 
 157. Id. at 1357 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC 
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(C)(2) (1998)). Other courts have also relied on the EEOC’s position. 
See, e.g., Wesolowski v. Napolitano, No. CV 211-163, 2013 WL 1286207, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 
2013) (“Additionally, the EEOC Compliance Manual makes a clear distinction between opposition 
and participation, requiring a reasonable good-faith belief for the former and explicitly not requiring 
that for the latter.”). 
 158. Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1357. 
 159. Id. at 1359–60. 
 160. Id. at 1360–61. 
 161. Id. at 1363; see supra note 144. 
 162. See Egei v. Johnson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 163. 192 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 164. Id. at 82. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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The plaintiff’s initial claim was that she was harassed by a 
supervisor and that she was “right-sized” because she refused to 
engage in sexual activities with him.168 At her EEO hearing, she 
testified inconsistently with her prior statements, and her employer 
proved those statements were false.169 As a result, the ALJ ruled the 
plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case, the alleged incidents 
did not happen, and the alleged events were not based on any 
prohibited reasons.170 
Approximately one and a half years after this decision, the 
plaintiff was terminated, and it is this termination upon which the 
plaintiff based her retaliation complaint.171 The plaintiff claimed she 
was terminated because of her prior EEO activity, a claim supported 
by her former employer’s statement that she was, in fact, terminated 
as a result of her earlier complaint and testimony.172 In fact, the 
plaintiff’s termination letter stated that “[t]he falsification of records, 
inaccurate statements and lack of candor [constituted] unacceptable 
behavior which [would] not be tolerated or condoned.”173 
The plaintiff filed a pro se complaint, alleging retaliation.174 In 
addressing the defendant’s motion to dismiss (or, in the alternative, 
summary judgment), the court framed the issue as being “[w]hether, 
as a matter of law, an employee may be subject to an adverse 
employment action on the basis of false or malicious statements made 
during the course of equal employment proceedings.”175 
After identifying the relevant statutory provision, the court noted 
the very different interpretations each party had regarding that 
provision.176 The plaintiff’s argument was simple—she was 
terminated because of her earlier EEO charge (and because of the 
testimony she provided in support of that charge), and Title VII 
prohibits such a termination.177 Predictably, the defendant had a 
different opinion—that it fired the plaintiff because she lied during the 
 
 168. Id. at 82–83. 
 169. Id. at 83–84. 
 170. Id. at 84. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 85. 
 175. Id. (alteration in original). 
 176. Id. at 85–86. 
 177. Id. at 85. 
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EEO process, not because she filed a charge or testified regarding it.178 
The employer argued that while Title VII protects employees from 
filing charges and testifying regarding those charges, the statute does 
not protect false or malicious statements made during the EEO 
process.179 
The court noted the split of authority, with some courts deciding 
employees are protected after engaging in this type of behavior, and 
other courts concluding employees lose protection under these 
circumstances.180 The court noted the D.C. Circuit had not yet 
addressed the issue, but that court had noted in dicta that the 
participation clause provides significant protection, and that its 
language “speaks in clear, absolute terms.”181 The court then restated 
the question before it—“whether the participation clause shields an 
employee from adverse action on the basis of any testimony she 
provides in an EEO proceeding . . . or whether the privilege [is] . . . a 
qualified one.”182 
The court looked at Pettway and at cases that followed it.183 
Included in this review was the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Glover, 
where the court observed that “all testimony in a Title VII proceeding 
is protected against punitive employer action.”184 As noted earlier, the 
Glover decision was based partially on the anti-retaliation provision’s 
language, which does not include limits on the participation clause’s 
scope; in fact, the statutory language suggests the protection is very 
broad.185 Quoting Glover, the court in Egei stated: 
Section 704(a)’s protections ensure not only that employers 
cannot intimidate their employees into for[ ]going the Title 
 
 178. Id. at 86. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. The court cited to two pro-employee cases, Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411 
(4th Cir. 1999), and Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969), and to one 
pro-employer case, Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 2004), to demonstrate the 
split on this issue. Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 86. 
 181. Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 86 (quoting Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 182. Id. at 86–87. 
 183. Id. at 87–88. 
 184. Id. at 87 (quoting Glover, 170 F.3d at 414). The other cases Egei cited were: 
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000), 
reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 
F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 266, 268 (3d Cir. 
2006); Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999); and Wyatt v. City of 
Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994). Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 88. 
 185. See supra Section II. 
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VII grievance process, but also that investigators will have 
access to the unchilled testimony of witnesses. . . . If a 
witness in a Title VII proceeding were secure from retaliation 
only when her testimony met some slippery reasonableness 
standard, she would surely be less than forthcoming. It 
follows that the application vel non of the participation clause 
should not turn on the substance of the testimony.186 
The court then noted many courts had adopted Pettway, and that 
the rule from Pettway does not apply to the “less protective” 
opposition clause.187 
Before deciding which interpretation it would adopt, the court 
addressed the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of Pettway.188 The reasons 
that court gave for rejecting Pettway were the following: “an employee 
could immunize his unreasonable and malicious” complaints by filing 
them with a government agency; and the belief that “the panels in 
Pettway and similar cases’ [couldn’t] actually believe that forging 
documents and coercing witnesses to give false testimony are 
protected conduct.’”189 
The court in Egei thus noted that at the time of its opinion, the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits adopted the employee-friendly Pettway rule, 
while the Seventh Circuit had rejected it.190 The court also noted that 
the other courts that had addressed this issue, including the D.C. 
Circuit, had either tacitly approved of Pettway or had commented on 
the participation clause’s broad protection.191 The court then decided 
it would follow Pettway.192 
The court based its conclusion first on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion 
in Parker.193 Specifically, when addressing the participation clause, 
that court noted the clause “speaks in clear, absolute terms, and has 
accordingly been interpreted as shielding recourse to the EEOC, 
regardless of the ultimate resolution of the underlying claim on the 
 
 186. Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 87–88 (quoting Glover, 170 F.3d at 414). 
 187. Id. at 88. See supra note 184 for the cases upon which the Egei court relied. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. (first quoting Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891; and then quoting Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. 
Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted)). 
 190. Id. The court also noted there were conflicting opinions on this issue within the Eighth 
Circuit. Id. at 88 n.4. 
 191. Id. at 88. 
 192. Id. at 88–89. 
 193. Id. at 89. 
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merits.”194 Realizing Congress’s goal was to protect employees who 
speak out against employers, the court noted a limited interpretation 
would chill employees’ willingness to file charges and would thus 
defeat the goal of combatting discrimination.195 Because the D.C. 
Circuit recognized the problems of limiting protection and had 
favorably cited to Pettway, Egei concluded affording broad protection 
was consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s position.196 
The second reason the court protected the plaintiff’s behavior was 
the anti-retaliation provision’s language.197 The language on which the 
court relied was the part of the participation clause that protects 
employees who “ha[ve] . . . participated in any manner” in an EEO 
proceeding.198 According to the court, and relying on Glover, “[a] 
straightforward reading of the statute’s unrestrictive language leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title VII 
proceeding” is protected.199The court also noted the Seventh Circuit’s 
pro-employer interpretation was not based on statutory language, but 
rather on the belief Congress could not have intended such an 
employee-friendly result.200 
The third reason the court gave was that a broad interpretation 
was consistent with the purpose behind Title VII, and that “[a]ctivities 
under the participation clause are essential to the machinery set up by 
Title VII.”201 Such activities would be “chilled,” and Title VII’s 
enforcement scheme would be frustrated, if employees could be 
terminated if they were unable to prove their claims.202 In fact, 
employees would be dissuaded from filing charges if they knew they 
could be terminated if their charge was not proven.203 
The court acknowledged the difference between mistaken claims 
of discrimination (ones that should be protected) and false claims 
(ones that perhaps should not be protected), but acknowledged that it 
 
 194. Id. (quoting Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 195. Id. (quoting Parker, 652 F.2d at 1019). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018)). 
 199. Id. (quoting Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 200. Id. (quoting Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
 201. Id. at 89 (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th 
Cir. 1998)). 
 202. Id. at 89–90 (quoting Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1005, 1019 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981)). 
 203. Id. at 90. 
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is very difficult to distinguish between the two.204 And because of that 
difficulty, providing protection for one, but not the other, would result 
in employees being unwilling to file charges.205 The court stated the 
following: 
A good-faith but mistaken claim of discrimination, of course, 
is not the same as a false claim of discrimination, and those 
judges who have rejected the Pettway rule have emphasized 
that the two can be distinguished. This might be true in a case 
where an employee admits to having lied. But absent such an 
admission, the risk of chilling legitimate claims and 
testimony remains. It would be cold comfort for claimants if 
they were nominally protected from adverse action on the 
basis of their testimony, but only to the extent that a judge, 
an ALJ, or even an employer concludes in “good faith” that 
such testimony was false or malicious.206 
This possibility, which would deter employees from coming 
forward as victims or as witnesses, was the third reason the court gave 
a broad interpretation to the participation clause.207 
The final reason the court gave for adopting this approach was 
that doing so was consistent with protections afforded to other 
plaintiffs.208 Analogizing to tort law, the court noted that individuals 
are absolutely privileged to make defamatory statements during those 
proceedings, and the court believed that because the purpose of such 
privilege is necessary to provide access to legal remedies, EEO 
complainants should be granted similar protection.209 Although 
protecting false testimony certainly has its drawbacks, the court 
weighed the advantages and disadvantages of that approach and 
concluded: 
This is not to condone lying or to suggest that false charges 
and testimony do not take a toll on administrative 
proceedings. The problem is that, in practice, it is not 
possible to permit employers to take adverse action against 
EEO claimants based on false charges or testimony—or 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. (citations omitted). 
 207. Id. at 89–90. 
 208. Id. at 90. 
 209. Id. 
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based on charges and testimony that the employer believes to 
be false—without chilling truthful charges and testimony.210 
The court then decided to tip the balance in favor of providing 
protection for employees.211 
The court did acknowledge there were legitimate arguments on 
the other side of this issue (including the possibility that employees 
will make more false and defamatory charges), and the court also 
limited its holding in three ways, including the limitation it placed on 
intentionally false and malicious statements.212 Specifically, the court 
questioned whether its interpretation would apply to that situation: 
Second, this is not a case in which an employee has admitted 
having made a false or malicious statement in the course of 
an EEO proceeding. The question whether such an admission 
would render a false or malicious statement actionable under 
Title VII, once again, is not before the Court; the question 
before the Court is simply whether an employer may punish 
an employee for offering testimony in an EEO proceeding 
that the employee asserts is true and that the employer 
disbelieves.213 
This limitation is, of course, the focus of this Article, and it is 
possible the court would not reach the same result in a case where it is 
clear the employee intentionally filed a false charge or provided false 
testimony.214 
One other court that adopted a broad interpretation of the 
participation clause was the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida.215 Booth v. Pasco County216 involved two 
plaintiffs; the first plaintiff alleged retaliation based on his filing of 
union grievances and EEOC charges, and the second plaintiff alleged 
retaliation after he was listed as a witness by the first plaintiff.217 After 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 90–91. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 91. 
 214. If, however, the court wants to protect knowingly false and malicious statements, it could 
rely on Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 977–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), which decided those 
statements were protected. 
 215. See Booth v. Pasco Cnty., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1199 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
 216. 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
 217. Id. at 1186. 
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addressing preliminary issues, the court addressed whether the 
plaintiffs engaged in protected activity.218 
The defendant presented several reasons it believed the charges 
were not protected, including the argument that the charges were 
unreasonable and made in bad faith.219 The court rejected this 
argument.220 First, the court correctly concluded that filing a charge 
qualifies as participation activity.221 The court then noted that although 
the reasonable, good-faith-belief standard applies to opposition 
activity, the parties disputed whether that standard applied to 
participation activity.222 The court decided the participation clause 
does not require the same reasonable, good-faith-belief standard.223 
First, the court acknowledged two recent cases within the 
Eleventh Circuit that raised this question but did not answer it.224 The 
court also noted there was a circuit split on the issue, with more 
circuits deciding not to utilize a reasonable, good-faith-belief 
standard.225 The union had asked the court to adopt the Seventh 
Circuit’s approach in Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc.,226 in which the court 
ruled in favor of the employer after it presented strong evidence the 
plaintiff’s charges were filed in bad faith and with a malicious 
purpose.227 The court in Mattson adopted the reasonable, good-faith-
belief standard and rejected the plaintiff’s participation claim, and the 
defendant in Booth wanted this court to do the same.228 The court 
refused to do so, noting the following regarding Pettway: 
 
 218. Id. at 1198. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 1199–201. 
 221. Id. at 1199. 
 222. Id. at 1199–200. 
 223. Id. at 1200. 
 224. Id. (first citing Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1998); 
and then citing Soto v. Bank of Am., No. 04-CV-782-ORL28JGG, 2005 WL 2861116, at *10 (M.D. 
Fla. Nov. 1, 2005)). In 2007, a court within the Eleventh Circuit rejected a good-faith requirement. 
See Holmes v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:06-CV-2556-CC-AJB, 2007 WL 9650147, at *42 
n.54 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 2007). More recently, a different court within the Eleventh Circuit followed 
Pettway and rejected limiting the participation clause. See Rodabaugh v. Regions Bank, No. 18-
CV-216, 2020 WL 1812299, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 9, 2020) (“But the Court will not apply the 
objective reasonableness requirement to [the plaintiff’s] participation clause argument because the 
Court believes that is most consistent with Pettway . . . .”). 
 225. Booth, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. 
 226. 359 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 227. Id. at 889–90. The Booth court noted that unlike in Mattson, the evidence did not support 
a finding of malicious intent. Booth, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 n.18. 
 228. Id. at 1200. 
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Given these and other considerations, the Court ultimately 
declined to make the protections given to an EEOC charge 
contingent on the contents of that charge, and held that such 
a charge would be protected even if it contained false, and/or 
malicious contents. Thus, the Court declined to read a good 
faith and reasonableness requirement into the protections 
afforded to the participation clause.229 
The Booth court also noted the majority of courts that had 
addressed this issue had not incorporated the reasonable, good-faith-
belief test into participation cases.230 In reaching its decision, the court 
relied on the following cases in addition to Pettway: Wyatt; Slagle v. 
County of Clarion;231 Johnson v. University of Cincinnati;232 and 
Glover.233 Based on the reasoning in those cases, the court in Booth 
rejected a heightened standard for participation cases, and it concluded 
the plaintiffs engaged in protected activity.234 
The opinions addressed in this Section, although not all 
specifically adopting the position that all participation activity is 
protected, certainly provide authority for a very broad interpretation 
of the participation clause. Not all courts, however, have adopted such 
a plaintiff-friendly approach.235 The next Section will discuss cases in 
 
 229. Id. at 1200–01 (citation omitted). 
 230. Id. at 1201. 
 231. 435 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2006). The Slagle court also relied on the EEOC Compliance 
Manual, which stated plaintiffs are protected regardless of whether their EEOC charges are valid 
or reasonable. Id. at 268. Since Slagle, the Third Circuit appears to have changed its position. See 
Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. 
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) for the following proposition: “Whether the employee opposes, 
or participates in a proceeding against, the employer’s activity, the employee must hold an 
objectively reasonable belief, in good faith, that the activity they oppose is unlawful under Title 
VII.” (emphasis added)). 
 232. 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000). Prior to Johnson, the court addressed an analogous state-law 
retaliation claim and relied heavily on Pettway. See Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 
879 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1989). In Booker, the court noted: 
The “exceptionally broad protection” of the participation clause extends to persons who 
have “participated in any manner” in Title VII proceedings. Protection is not lost if the 
employee is wrong on the merits of the charge, nor is protection lost if the contents of 
the charge are malicious and defamatory as well as wrong. Thus, once the activity in 
question is found to be within the scope of the participation clause, the employee is 
generally protected from retaliation. 
Id. at 1312 (citations omitted). 
 233. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 234. Booth, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1201; see also Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 977–
79 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (assuming that the plaintiff’s statements were false and malicious but deciding 
that the participation clause protected them). 
 235. See infra Section III.B. 
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which the court was unwilling to provide such broad protection for 
employees seeking protection under the participation clause. 
B.  Courts that Have Taken a Pro-Employer Position 
Not surprisingly, some courts have decided the participation 
clause’s protections do not extend to plaintiffs who knowingly engage 
in false participation activity.236 Despite acknowledging the 
participation clause’s broad language, these courts believe that 
Congress could not have intended to protect these individuals; that 
doing so would have the effect of providing job security for bad 
employees;237 and that the Supreme Court’s Breeden opinion applies 
to the participation clause.238 Some of these pro-employer cases will 
now be discussed. 
One of the most commonly cited opinions for the proposition that 
the participation clause does not protect false charges is Mattson. 
Unlike some of the cases discussed previously, this case squarely 
addressed whether knowingly filing false EEOC charges is 
protected.239 The court decided it is not.240 In Mattson, the plaintiff 
filed a charge with the EEOC and with Illinois’s equivalent state 
agency.241 The charge was based on minor incidents between the 
plaintiff and his supervisor, incidents in which he alleged his 
supervisor engaged in physical contact with him.242 These allegations 
had previously been investigated internally, with the conclusion being 
that the plaintiff’s complaint was meritless.243 
Three months after that internal investigation, the plaintiff filed 
the charge with the EEOC and the equivalent state agency.244 After 
conducting a second internal investigation and concluding that not 
 
 236. See, e.g., Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 892 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 237. Id. at 891; see also Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“[P]articipation doesn’t insulate an employee from being discharged for conduct that, if it occurred 
outside an investigation, would warrant termination.”); Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior 
Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 740 (8th Cir. 2005) (highlighting that employees cannot lie and file false 
charges without suffering repercussions because “[t]o do so would leave employers with no ability 
to fire employees for defaming other employees or the employer through their complaint when the 
allegations are without any basis in fact”). 
 238. See, e.g., Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891–92. 
 239. Id. at 889–92. 
 240. Id. at 892. 
 241. Id. at 888. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
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only did no harassment take place, but that the plaintiff made the 
accusations to retaliate against his supervisor, the employer fired the 
plaintiff.245 This gave rise to the retaliation claim.246 The district court 
granted summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.247 The district 
court based its opinion on the plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate a 
retaliatory motive, but the Seventh Circuit focused its attention on 
whether the plaintiff had engaged in protected activity.248 The court 
concluded he had not.249 
The court first concluded the harassment charge was “both 
objectively and subjectively unreasonable, as well as made with the 
bad faith purpose of retaliating against his female supervisor.”250 
Despite this finding, the plaintiff argued he was protected under the 
participation clause because, unlike the opposition clause, the 
participation clause does not impose a reasonable, good-faith-belief 
standard.251 The plaintiff relied on several opinions for this 
argument,252 but the court rejected it because “none of [the plaintiff’s] 
cases actually involved a plaintiff who filed unreasonable charges, let 
alone charges that were both unreasonable and made in bad faith.”253 
The case the Seventh Circuit believed was most supportive of the 
plaintiff’s position was Pettway, but even that case was unable to save 
the plaintiff.254 The court distinguished Pettway by noting that 
although the substance of the Pettway plaintiff’s allegations was false, 
there was no evidence the Pettway plaintiff was “motivated by 
malice.”255 The court also distinguished Pettway by noting the 
allegations in that case were not baseless, unlike those before the court 
in Mattson.256 When wrapping up its discussion of Pettway, the court 
noted the following: 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 888–92. 
 249. Id. at 891–92. 
 250. Id. at 889. 
 251. Id. 
 252. The cases upon which the plaintiff relied were Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 
F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1980); Booker v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); and Pettway v. Am. Cast 
Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969). Mattson, 359 F.3d at 889–90. 
 253. Id. at 890. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
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This stands in stark contrast to Mattson’s charges, which as 
already discussed did not objectively state a claim of sexual 
harassment. Furthermore, there is evidence that Mattson’s 
claim was filed maliciously. Thus, Pettway does not persuade 
this Court that employees should receive Title VII protection 
for filing unreasonable charges in bad faith.257 
After distinguishing Pettway and other cases upon which the 
plaintiff relied,258 the court cited cases from the Seventh Circuit and 
concluded that “utterly baseless” claims did not receive protection.259 
The court observed why it was appropriate to include a reasonableness 
requirement and a good-faith requirement in participation cases: 
The purpose of requiring that plaintiffs reasonably believe in 
good faith that they have suffered discrimination is clear. 
Title VII was designed to protect the rights of employees who 
in good faith protest the discrimination they believe they 
have suffered and to ensure that such employees remain free 
from reprisals or retaliatory conduct. Title VII was not 
designed to “arm employees with a tactical coercive weapon” 
under which employees can make baseless claims simply to 
“advance their own retaliatory motives and strategies.”260 
The court acknowledged the Seventh Circuit had not yet approved 
the “utterly baseless” standard for participation cases, but it also noted 
the court had not limited that standard only to opposition cases.261 It 
then stated the same standard should apply to all retaliation cases.262 
The court gave the following reasons for applying the same standard 
to all of these cases: (1) without adopting the same standard, an 
employee could “immunize” an unreasonable and malicious internal 
complaint by making the same allegations with a government agency; 
(2) an employee could give himself “unlimited tenure” by filing 
numerous EEOC charges before the employer realizes the internal 
allegations were false and malicious; and (3) such a standard “would 
 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. The cases upon which the court relied were Fine v. Ryan International Airlines, 305 
F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996); and Dey 
v. Colt Construction & Development Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1458 (7th Cir. 1994). Mattson, 359 F.3d 
at 890. 
 260. Id. (quoting Spadola v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 242 F. Supp. 2d 284, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
 261. Id. at 890–91. 
 262. Id. at 891. 
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encourage the abuse of Title VII and the proceedings that it 
establishes.”263 
Finally, the court addressed the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Breeden, which rejected a plaintiff’s opposition claim because her 
belief she was the victim of sexual harassment was unreasonable.264 
Although acknowledging Breeden involved opposition, Mattson 
applied Breeden to this participation case.265 The court explained this 
in the following manner: 
While we acknowledge that the Supreme Court did not apply 
the reasonableness requirement in a participation clause 
context, the Supreme Court also did not hold that the 
reasonableness requirement only applies to the opposition 
clause. Because the Supreme Court did not distinguish 
between opposition and participation claims, we also decline 
to do so and hold that the good faith, reasonableness 
requirement applies to all Title VII claims.266 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit read into the participation clause a 
reasonableness requirement even though Breeden did not address that 
specific issue (nor did it have a reason to do so).267 
The court then stated it was not setting a high bar for plaintiffs 
seeking participation-clause protection.268 Employees would still be 
protected if they were mistaken on the merits of their charge, and pro 
se claimants would still be protected if, despite their best efforts, their 
self-drafted complaints did not state a legal claim.269 Nonetheless, 
 
 263. Id. The court then distinguished two cases upon which the plaintiff relied: Johnson v. 
University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000), and Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 
F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 1998). Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891. Also see Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical 
Center, 619 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2010), where the court relied on Mattson for the proposition 
that such a broad interpretation would “encourage the abuse of Title VII and the proceedings that 
it established.” 
 264. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891–92. 
 265. Id.at 892. For a discussion of Breeden and its application to the participation clause, see 
Rosenthal, supra note 46. 
 266.  Mattson, 359 F.3d at 892. Mattson is not the only case to apply Breeden to participation 
cases. See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Breeden, 532 
U.S. at 271) (“Whether the employee opposes, or participates in a proceeding against, the 
employer’s activity, the employee must hold an objectively reasonable belief, in good faith, that 
the activity they oppose is unlawful under Title VII.” (emphasis added)); Rosenthal, supra note 46, 
at 365 n.132. 
 267. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 892. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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here, because the plaintiff’s charge was unreasonable, meritless, and 
motivated by malice, the court was unwilling to protect it.270 
Another court that appeared to adopt a pro-employer position was 
the Eighth Circuit, which did so in Gilooly v. Missouri Department of 
Health and Senior Services.271 In Gilooly, an investigator concluded 
the plaintiff’s statements made during an investigation into sexual 
harassment were not credible and that the plaintiff lied during the 
investigatory process.272 The plaintiff was ultimately terminated, at 
least in part because of his “deception” during the investigation.273 
When addressing whether summary judgment in favor of the employer 
was appropriate, the court noted the following: 
However, it also cannot be true that a plaintiff can file false 
charges, lie to an investigator, and possibly defame co-
employees, without suffering repercussions simply because 
the investigation was about sexual harassment. To do so 
would leave employers with no ability to fire employees for 
defaming other employees or the employer through their 
complaint when the allegations are without any basis in 
fact.274 
This statement, however, was made in the context of deciding 
whether there was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse 
employment action, which occurs after the plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case.275 Nonetheless, despite appearing to decide the 
plaintiff established a prima facie case, the above-quoted language 
provides more limited protection under the participation clause.276 
As demonstrated in this Section, courts are not unanimous 
regarding whether Title VII protects individuals who knowingly 
 
 270. Id. See also Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical Center, 619 F.3d 741, 745–46 (7th Cir. 2010), 
where the court relied on Mattson and stated that the participation clause does not provide absolute 
protection. 
 271. 421 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 272. Id. at 737. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 740. 
 275. Id. Despite appearing to conclude the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the court 
indicated it was unwilling to protect knowingly false statements. Id. at 741. In a separate opinion, 
Judge Colloton cited Mattson with approval and stated the majority implicitly adopted Mattson. Id. 
at 742–43 (Colloton, J., concurring in part). See also Hatmaker, 619 F.3d at 745, which utilized the 
language above from Gilooly in deciding Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision does not protect 
frivolous accusations. 
 276. Id. at 739–41. The court then remanded the case because an issue of fact precluded 
summary judgment. Id. at 741. 
(8) 54.4_ROSENTHAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:37 PM 
1186 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1151 
engage in false participation activities. Although several courts have 
protected false statements and allegations, some of those courts were 
careful to note they were not directly confronted with knowingly false, 
malicious, and/or bad-faith charges and/or testimony.277 The next part 
will explain why, even though it might seem distasteful to protect this 
type of activity, doing so might be necessary.278 
IV.  WHY COURTS MIGHT HAVE TO PROTECT KNOWINGLY FALSE 
PARTICIPATION ACTIVITIES 
Although it might seem odd to protect employees who knowingly 
engage in false participation activities, courts might have to do so. This 
part explains why protecting these individuals might be a necessary 
evil with which employers and courts must live.279 The reasons for this 
conclusion include: (A) the participation clause’s broad language; (B) 
the EEOC’s position on this issue; (C) the incorrect argument that 
providing protection will prevent employers from being able to fire 
bad employees; and (D) the purpose of Title VII and the role of the 
EEOC.280 These arguments will now be addressed. 
A.  The Statutory Language Arguably Protects Individuals Who 
Knowingly Engage in False Participation Activities 
When interpreting a statute, the first place courts must look is to 
the statute’s language.281 Several courts that have given a broad 
interpretation to the participation clause have done so because of the 
very broad language Congress used in the participation clause.282 
Specifically, courts have relied on the “or participated in any manner” 
language in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause 
 
 277. See, e.g., Egei v. Johnson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 81, 91 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 278. See supra note 9. 
 279. Although these arguments are based on arguments utilized by courts that addressed false 
participation activity, future courts could distinguish some of those cases the way the court in 
Mattson did, which is to point out that some of them did not involve false charges made in bad 
faith. Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 280. Another reason for protecting these employees is that protecting EEOC complaints, even 
those that are malicious or untrue, is “consistent with protections afforded complainants in other 
legal regimes.” Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 90. 
 281. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010); Robinson v. Shell Oil 
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). 
 282. See supra Section III.A. 
(8) 54.4_ROSENTHAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:37 PM 
2021] EMPLOYEE’S RIGHT TO FILE FALSE EEOC CHARGES 1187 
when providing very broad protection to participation-clause 
plaintiffs.283 
Because of the “participated in any manner” language Congress 
used when describing what the participation clause protects, several 
courts have interpreted the statute to mean an employee will be 
protected as long as he is engaging in any participation activity.284 
Several of the cases discussed earlier relied on this statutory language 
when deciding to provide broad protection under the participation 
clause.285 For example, the Fifth Circuit in Pettway stated the 
following: 
There can be no doubt about the purpose of § 704(a). In 
unmistakable language it is to protect the employee who 
utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his rights. 
The Act will be frustrated if the employer may unilaterally 
determine the truth or falsity of charges and take independent 
action.286 
Thus, Title VII’s language was one reason why the Pettway court 
provided broad protection under the participation clause.287 
The Fourth Circuit also addressed the statutory language when it 
protected a plaintiff’s unnecessary and unresponsive deposition 
testimony in another employee’s EEO case.288 In Glover, the court 
assumed the plaintiff’s testimony was unreasonable, but it relied on 
Title VII’s language when deciding the testimony was still 
protected.289 Relying on that language, the court stated the following: 
Reading a reasonableness test into section 704(a)’s 
participation clause would do violence to the text of that 
provision and would undermine the objectives of Title VII. 
 
 283. See, e.g., Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 89 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018)). Some of 
the employee-friendly cases that focused on this language were addressed previously, and some of 
those cases will also be discussed in this Section. 
 284. See supra Section III.A and cases cited therein. In addition to the cases that will be 
addressed herein, the court in Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), 
also acknowledged there is a textual argument that supports the proposition that false and malicious 
claims are protected. 
 285. See supra Section III.A and cases cited therein. 
 286. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004–05 (5th Cir. 1969) (emphasis 
added). 
 287. Id. at 1004–07. 
 288. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 289. Id. at 414–16. 
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 The plain language of the participation clause itself 
forecloses us from improvising such a reasonableness test. 
The clause forbids retaliation against an employee who “has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner” in a protected proceeding. Glover was fired because 
she “testified” in a Title VII deposition. The term “testify” 
has a plain meaning: “[t]o bear witness” or “to give evidence 
as a witness.”290 
The court then cited to other courts that granted broad protection 
under the participation clause, all of which focused on the statutory 
language.291 The Glover court observed the activities listed in the 
participation clause are “‘not preceded or followed by any restrictive 
language that limits its reach.’ In fact, it is followed by the phrase ‘in 
any manner’—a clear signal that the provision is meant to sweep 
broadly.”292 In wrapping up this point, the court stated “Congress 
could not have carved out in clearer terms this safe harbor from 
employer retaliation. A straightforward reading of the statute’s 
unrestrictive language leads inexorably to the conclusion that all 
testimony in a Title VII proceeding is protected against punitive 
employer action.”293 
Other courts have also relied on the statutory language when 
interpreting the participation clause. The First Circuit in Wyatt stated 
that under the participation clause, “there is nothing in its wording 
requiring that the charges be valid, nor even an implied requirement 
that they be reasonable.”294 Although some of these appellate-court 
cases might not have specifically involved knowingly false and 
 
 290. Id. at 414 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court also 
described the participation clause as “unambiguous and specific.” Id. at 415. 
 291. Id. at 414. The cases upon which the court relied were Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1006 n.18 and 
Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997). Id. 
 292. Glover, 170 F.3d at 414 (citing Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1186). The court in Merritt stated the 
following regarding the participation clause: “the adjective ‘any’ is not ambiguous . . . . ‘[It] has an 
expansive meaning, that is, “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.”’ . . . ‘[A]ny’ means 
all.” Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1186 (citation omitted) (quoting States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)). 
 293. Glover, 170 F.3d at 414 (emphasis added). 
 294. Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994). The Eleventh Circuit has also 
observed that the statutory language requires different levels of protection for opposition claims 
and participation claims. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The statutory retaliation 
provision has two distinct components. Both offer employees some protection, but that these two 
components should offer two different levels of protection is consistent with the plain reading and 
purposes of the statute.”). 
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malicious actions, the courts were clear that participation-clause 
protection is extremely broad. 
United States district courts have also relied on the statutory 
language to conclude protection under the participation clause is very 
broad. For example, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia relied on Glover when addressing the participation clause’s 
language and stated the following: 
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he plain language of the 
participation clause itself foreclose[d]” a limited 
interpretation of its scope. As the court explained, “[t]he 
word ‘testified’ is not proceeded [sic] or followed by any 
restrictive language that limits its reach”; indeed, “it is 
followed by the phrase ‘in any manner’—a clear signal that 
the provision is meant to sweep broadly.”295 
The court also stated the following regarding the participation 
clause’s language: 
Second, the text of the participation clause itself militates in 
favor of protection for the substance of statements made in 
the course of EEO proceedings, even if false or malicious. 
As then-Chief Judge Wilkinson observed, the participation 
clause forbids retaliation against an employee who “has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner” in a protected proceeding. “A straightforward 
reading of the statute’s unrestrictive language leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title VII 
proceeding”—or at least the substance of such testimony—
“is protected against punitive employer action.”296 
Thus, this was another case in which the court acknowledged the 
participation clause’s broad language and its protection for almost all 
participation activities. 
Even cases that ultimately ruled in favor of employers have 
acknowledged the participation clause is extremely broad. For 
example, the Tenth Circuit in Vaughn v. Epworth Villa297 
 
 295. Egei v. Johnson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 2016) (first, second, and third alterations 
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Glover, 170 F.3d at 414). 
 296. Id. at 89 (citations omitted) (quoting Glover, 170 F.3d at 414). The court also observed 
that the Seventh Circuit’s position was “not premised on the language of the statute, but on a 
disbelief that Congress could possibly have intended to protect” lying. Id. 
 297. 537 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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acknowledged the participation clause’s broad language when 
concluding the plaintiff engaged in protected activity.298 Although the 
court ultimately ruled the employer had a legitimate, non-retaliatory 
reason for the adverse employment action, the court decided the 
plaintiff had engaged in protected activity.299 The court reviewed how 
other courts had applied broad protection under the participation 
clause and had relied on that clause’s language.300 The court noted the 
following: 
“When interpreting the language of a statute, the starting 
point is always the language of the statute itself.” . . . In this 
case, the participation clause plainly provides that 
individuals may not be retaliated against when they 
“participate[ ] in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 
or hearing under” Title VII. We fail to see how this language 
places the kind of obligation on the employee that the district 
court here imposed—the obligation to resort only to honest 
and loyal conduct in advancing a claim unless the employee 
proves that it is necessary to resort to other means. . . . 
“‘[R]ead naturally, the word “any” has an expansive 
meaning,’ and thus, so long as ‘Congress did not add any 
language limiting the breadth of that word,’ the term ‘any’ 
must be given literal effect.” Accordingly, given the plain 
language of the participation clause, we must conclude that 
[the plaintiff] engaged in a “protected activity” when she 
submitted the unredacted medical records to the EEOC.301 
Although the court ultimately ruled that terminating the plaintiff 
for providing unredacted records to the EEOC was a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for the adverse action, the court determined that, 
based on the participation clause’s language, the conduct was 
 
 298. Id. at 1151–52. 
 299. Id. at 1152–55. 
 300. Id. at 1152. The court relied on the following cases when addressing the participation 
clause’s broad protection: Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003); Booker v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 
588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 
n.18 (5th Cir. 1969); and Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2006). Vaughn, 
537 F.3d at 1152. After reviewing those cases, the court noted: “Based on the participation clause’s 
plain language, we believe the broad coverage afforded to the clause by these courts is well 
founded.” Id. 
 301. Id. (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). The court was careful to note it was not 
addressing whether such broad protection should be afforded to fraudulent claims. Id. at 1152 n.2. 
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protected for the purpose of establishing a prima facie case.302 Of 
course, this was of little consolation to the plaintiff, as the court 
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the 
employer.303 
Other courts that reached pro-employer outcomes have also 
concluded the statute’s language provides broad protection for 
participation activity. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Villa v. 
CavaMezze Grill, LLC,304 acknowledged the participation clause’s 
language was “unambiguous and specific,” and that its broad 
protection leads to the conclusion that “firing someone for testifying 
in a Title VII deposition is plainly prohibited, regardless of whether 
the testimony is unreasonable.”305 Even though that court ultimately 
ruled against the plaintiff, it did acknowledge the participation 
clause’s breadth.306 
Despite numerous courts’ broad interpretations of the 
participation clause’s language, there are some arguments against 
such a broad interpretation of that language, which courts could try to 
use if they want to avoid protecting employees who knowingly engage 
in false participation activities. One argument against such a broad 
interpretation of the “in any manner” language is that this phrase 
follows specific actions such as making a charge, testifying, or 
assisting, and as a result, the “participated in any manner” language 
refers only to other, similar actions, and not to particular motives the 
person has while engaging in the activity.307 
 
 302. Id. at 1152–55. The court ruled against the plaintiff because it decided the plaintiff’s 
activity was also a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. Id. at 1154. 
 303. Id. at 1155. By allowing the employer to prevail at the legitimate, non-retaliatory 
reason/pretext stage, the court minimized the relevance of the prima facie case. See Hatmaker v. 
Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[P]articipation doesn’t insulate an employee 
from being discharged for conduct that, if it occurred outside an investigation, would warrant 
termination. This includes making frivolous accusations, or accusations grounded in prejudice.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 304. 858 F.3d 896 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 305. Id. at 902 (citing Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414–15 (4th Cir. 1999)). The 
court also noted that in the opposition context, prohibiting employers from disciplining employees 
who fabricate allegations was not appropriate. Id. at 901–02. 
 306. Id. at 902 (“[T]he text of the participation clause is unambiguous and specific.” (quoting 
Glover, 170 F.3d at 415)); see also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 
221 F.3d 1171, 1174–76 (11th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(acknowledging the breadth of the participation clause’s language). 
 307. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018). 
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The Seventh Circuit in Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical Center308 
made a similar point and rejected the idea that the participation 
clause’s language requires such an expansive interpretation.309 The 
court criticized pro-plaintiff courts’ broad interpretations of the 
participation clause by stating the following: 
To these courts[,] “participated in any manner” in an 
investigation seems to mean “participated by any and all 
means” rather than participated in any capacity, whether 
formally or informally, whether as complainant or as a 
witness, and at whatever stage of the investigation. But these 
courts can’t actually believe that forging documents and 
coercing witnesses to give false testimony are protected 
conduct. And if they don’t believe that, why do they think 
lying is protected?310 
Thus, the Hatmaker court appears to believe that the “in any 
manner” refers to particular acts of participation, not to the motivation 
behind those acts.311 This interpretation seems to utilize the canon of 
statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which provides as follows: 
“[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory 
enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects 
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific 
words.”312 Using this canon of construction is one way courts can 
avoid protecting individuals who knowingly engage in false 
participation activities, while still adhering to the statutory language. 
Specifically, courts can interpret “in any manner” as referring only to 
actions like making a charge, testifying, and taking other actions 
associated with the EEO process. 
Another argument against such a broad reading of the 
participation clause is the rule that courts can ignore a statute’s 
language if applying that language would yield an absurd result.313 At 
 
 308. 619 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 309. Id. at 746. This case involved an internal complaint, not one that occurred either as a result 
of, or simultaneously with, the filing of an EEOC charge. Id. at 745. 
 310. Id. at 746. 
 311. See id. 
 312. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Est. of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 
384 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 
(2001)). 
 313. See, e.g., Colón-Marrero v. Vélez, 813 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Our starting point in 
discerning the meaning of a statute is the provision itself, and ‘[t]he plain meaning of a statute’s 
text must be given effect “unless it would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at odds with 
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least one court has referenced this rule when addressing the 
participation clause.314 The court in Glover, when deciding to protect 
the plaintiff’s participation activity, stated that providing such 
protection “would not lead . . . to an absurd result.”315 Specifically, the 
court stated: 
This interpretation would not lead, as SLED contends, to an 
absurd result. Our holding does not permit employees to 
immunize improper behavior simply by filing an EEOC 
complaint. “[A]n EEOC complaint creates no right on the 
part of an employee to miss work, fail to perform assigned 
work, or leave work without notice.” Employers retain, as 
they always have, the right to discipline or terminate 
employees for any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.316 
Thus, the court was willing to adhere to what it believed the 
statute’s language required—protection for the plaintiff’s 
participation activity—and the court believed that applying the 
statutory language did not yield an absurd result.317 Of course, if a 
court did not wish to protect employees who knowingly engage in 
false participation activity, the court could conclude that protecting 
such behavior would yield the absurd result that an employee would 
be protected for engaging in malicious and deceptive behavior. 
As has been addressed, courts that adopt a broad interpretation of 
the participation clause do so, in part, because of the clause’s 
language. As was also pointed out, however, if courts do not want to 
reward false and malicious actions, there are possible avenues to 
pursue without ignoring the statutory language. The statutory 
language is not, however, the only reason courts might have to protect 
these employees. As will be addressed next, some courts do so to be 
consistent with the EEOC, which has expressed its position that the 
participation clause does provide protection in these circumstances.318 
 
the statute’s intended effect.”’” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Arnold v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 858 (1st Cir. 1998), abrogated by Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
527 U.S. 471 (1999))). 
 314. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 315. Id. at 414–15 (emphasis added). 
 316. Id. at 414 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Ralston Purina Co., 
557 F.2d 570, 572 (6th Cir. 1977)). 
 317. Id. at 414–15. 
 318. See Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra note 14. 
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B.  The EEOC Supports a Broad Interpretation of the Participation 
Clause 
Another reason courts protect knowingly false participation 
activities is that the EEOC, the agency charged with administering 
Title VII, has expressed its position that such protection is 
warranted.319 Although the EEOC’s position is not always binding on 
the courts,320 several courts have deferred to the EEOC on this issue.321 
The EEOC has stated the following: 
Participation in the EEO process is protected whether or not 
the EEO allegation is based on a reasonable, good faith 
belief that a violation occurred. This does not mean that 
falsehoods or bad faith are without consequence. An 
employer is free to bring these to light in the EEO matter, 
where it may rightly affect the outcome. But it is unlawful 
retaliation for an employer to take matters into its own hands 
and impose consequences for participating in an EEO 
matter.322 
The EEOC has also stated the following regarding Title VII’s 
anti-retaliation provision’s opposition clause and participation clause: 
An individual is protected from retaliation for opposition to 
discrimination as long as s/he had a reasonable and good faith 
 
 319. Id. 
 320. The EEOC’s position is “‘not entitled to full Chevron deference,’ but it is entitled to a 
‘measure of respect under the less deferential . . . standard’ because it ‘reflect[s] a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’” 
Calhoun v. EPS Corp., 36 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1357 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted), vacated in part, No. 13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 12799080 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014). 
The Supreme Court has, at times, ignored the EEOC’s position on other issues regarding federal 
EEO statutes. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) 
(rejecting the EEOC’s position regarding the scope of the ADEA because the EEOC’s position was 
“clearly wrong”); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (rejecting the EEOC’s 
position regarding how to decide whether an individual has a disability under the ADA because the 
EEOC’s position was “an impermissible interpretation of the ADA”), superseded by statute, ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–59. 
 321. See, e.g., Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1356–57; see also Wesolowski v. Napolitano, No. 
CV 211-163, 2013 WL 1286207, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2013) (“Additionally, the EEOC 
Compliance Manual makes a clear distinction between opposition and participation, requiring a 
reasonable good faith belief for the former and explicitly not requiring that for the latter.”); Mezu 
v. Morgan State Univ., No. WMN-09-2855, 2013 WL 3934013, at *10–11 (D. Md. July 29, 2013) 
(citing to Wesolowski and to the EEOC Compliance Manual, concluding “that the Fourth Circuit 
would follow the clear majority rule and not require participation clause plaintiffs to establish 
reasonable belief in the merits of their underlying charge or complaint”). 
 322. Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra 
note 29 (emphasis added). 
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belief that s/he was opposing an unlawful discriminatory 
practice, and the manner of opposition was reasonable. An 
individual is protected against retaliation for participation 
in the charge process, however, regardless of the validity or 
reasonableness of the original allegation of 
discrimination.323 
As stated earlier, courts have relied on the EEOC’s position when 
deciding to protect false participation activities. For example, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia relied 
on the EEOC’s position when discussing the breadth of the 
participation clause’s protection.324 In acknowledging a broad level of 
protection, the court relied on the EEOC Compliance Manual when it 
noted a plaintiff is protected under the participation clause regardless 
of whether the allegations in the original charge were valid or 
reasonable.325 Other courts have also relied on the EEOC’s position, 
providing broader protection under the participation clause than under 
the opposition clause.326 
Therefore, in addition to the participation clause’s plain language, 
the EEOC’s position provides another reason it might be necessary to 
protect employees who knowingly engage in false participation 
activities. If, however, courts do not feel comfortable granting such 
protection, they can deny protection by ignoring the EEOC’s position, 
 
 323. Section 2 Threshold Issues, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (May 12, 2000), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-2-threshold-issues#2-II-A-5 (emphasis added). 
 324. Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1356–57; see also Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 
268 (3d Cir. 2006) (relying on the EEOC Compliance Manual for the proposition that “a plaintiff 
is protected under the participation clause ‘regardless of whether the allegations in the original 
charge were valid or reasonable’”). 
 325. Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1356–57 (relying on the EEOC’s Compliance Manual for the 
proposition that “courts have consistently held that a respondent is liable for retaliating against an 
individual for filing an EEOC charge regardless of the validity or reasonableness of the charge”). 
As noted earlier, the court in Calhoun reversed its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff, but it did once again note the participation clause’s “near-absolute” protection. 
Calhoun v. EPS Corp., No. 13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 12799080, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014). Also 
see Booth v. Pasco County, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1201 (M.D. Fla. 2011), where the court cited to 
Slagle, 435 F.3d at 268, for relying on the EEOC’s position that “a plaintiff is protected under the 
participation clause ‘regardless of whether the allegations in the original charge were valid or 
reasonable.’” 
 326. See Wesolowski, 2013 WL 1286207, at *7 (“Additionally, the EEOC Compliance Manual 
makes a clear distinction between opposition and participation, requiring a reasonable good faith 
belief for the former and explicitly not requiring that for the latter.”); Mezu, 2013 WL 3934013, at 
*10–11 (citing to Wesolowski and to the EEOC Compliance Manual and concluding “that the 
Fourth Circuit would follow the clear majority rule and not require participation clause plaintiffs 
to establish reasonable belief in the merits of their underlying charge or complaint”). 
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saying it is an unreasonable interpretation of Title VII.327 In addition 
to the statutory language and the EEOC’s position, however, there is 
another reason courts might have to protect this type of activity; 
specifically, the popular, pro-employer argument that protecting these 
employees would guarantee them workplace tenure is not true. 
C.  Providing Protection Will Not Provide “Tenure” for Bad 
Employees. 
One reason employers give for trying to limit the participation 
clause is that bad employees will be able to achieve workplace tenure 
simply by filing EEOC charges.328 Despite the appeal of this argument 
to employers, this is not true. As some courts and the EEOC have 
recognized, employers are still free to discipline employees for poor 
performance or for other legitimate reasons.329 Employers are 
prohibited only from disciplining an employee because of his EEO 
activities.330 
One court that addressed this issue was the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida.331 In Booth, the court noted 
that adopting a broad interpretation of the participation clause “does 
not render employers hostage to vindictive employees. Employers 
may still discipline, and/or terminate employees who filed EEOC 
charges, they simply cannot do so because they filed such a charge.”332 
The Fourth Circuit also recognized protecting this type of 
participation would not allow employees to gain tenure by filing 
EEOC charges.333 In Glover, the court determined that even though 
 
 327. See supra note 325. 
 328. See, e.g., Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2010); Mattson v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 329. See, e.g., Booth, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 n.20; see also Enforcement Guidance on 
Retaliation and Related Issues, supra note 14 (“The breadth of these anti-retaliation protections 
does not mean that employees can immunize themselves from consequences for poor performance 
or improper behavior by raising an internal EEO allegation or filing a discrimination claim with an 
enforcement agency.”). 
 330. Booth, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 n.20. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id.; see also Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 
1989) (“However, the fact an employee files a complaint or a charge does not create any right on 
the part of the employee ‘to miss work, fail to perform assigned work, or leave work without 
notice,’ unless absence from work is necessitated by proceedings that occur subsequent to the filing 
of a complaint or charge.” (citation omitted)). Although Booker involved a state-law retaliation 
claim, it is another example of a court noting that filing EEOC charges does not, as employers have 
contended, provide job security for bad employees. See id. 
 333. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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Title VII protects unreasonable testimony, that determination “does 
not permit employees to immunize improper behavior simply by filing 
an EEOC complaint.”334 The court continued, noting that such a 
complaint “creates no right on the part of an employee to miss work, 
fail to perform assigned work, or leave work without notice[,]”335 and 
“[e]mployers retain, as they always have, the right to discipline or 
terminate employees for any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”336 
The EEOC has also recognized that filing an EEOC charge does 
not immunize a worker from an adverse employment action.337 
Specifically, the EEOC has stated the following: 
Neither participation nor opposition give permission to an 
employee to neglect job duties, violate employer rules, or do 
anything else that would otherwise result in consequences for 
poor performance evaluations or misconduct. Even though 
the anti-retaliation laws are very broad, employers remain 
free to discipline or terminate employees for poor 
performance or improper behavior, even if the employee 
made an EEO complaint.338 
Some courts, on the other hand, have agreed with employers that, 
despite the EEOC’s position on this issue, and despite several courts’ 
statements that employers can still terminate employees who engage 
in participation activities, bad employees will be allowed to gain job 
security by filing EEOC charges.339 One such court was the Seventh 
Circuit, which stated the following: “[s]imilarly, an employee could 
assure himself unlimited tenure by filing continuous complaints with 
the government agency if he fears that his employer will discover his 
duplicitous behavior at the workplace.”340 Although some employers 
 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. (quoting Brown v. Ralston Purina Co., 557 F.2d 570, 572 (6th Cir. 1977)). 
 336. Id. 
 337. Small Business Fact Sheet: Retaliation and Related Issues, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/small-business-
fact-sheet-retaliation-and-related-issues (“Engaging in EEO activity does not shield an employee 
from discipline or discharge. Employers are free to discipline or terminate workers if motivated by 
non-retaliatory and non-discriminatory reasons that would otherwise result in such 
consequences.”). 
 338. Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra 
note 29. 
 339. See, e.g., Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2010); Mattson v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 340. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891; see also Hatmaker, 619 F.3d at 745–46 (citing Mattson for this 
proposition and rejecting unlimited protection under the participation clause). 
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have convinced courts of this possibility, other courts and the EEOC 
have argued this is not true, as employers are still free to terminate bad 
employees.341 The only limitation is the employer cannot do so 
because an employee engaged in participation activities.342 
So, while a broad interpretation of the participation clause might 
have to protect employees if they knowingly file false charges or 
provide false testimony in an EEO proceeding, employers are still free 
to take adverse actions against those employees if, notwithstanding 
their participation activities, their job performance warrants discipline. 
As a result, the employers’ argument that employees can achieve 
workplace tenure by filing malicious EEOC charges is incorrect and 
is another reason courts might have to protect these activities. The 
final reason for this pro-employee outcome, Title VII’s purpose and 
process (including the EEOC’s role in that process), will now be 
addressed. 
D.  Providing Broad Protection Is Consistent with Title VII’s 
Remedial Scheme, and Not Providing Protection Will Deter 
Employees with Legitimate Claims from Coming Forward343 
In addition to the previously discussed reasons why courts might 
have to protect individuals who knowingly engage in false 
participation activity, there is yet another reason for doing so. 
Specifically, several courts have noted that Title VII’s goal of 
eliminating workplace discrimination, and the EEOC’s role in that 
process, are critical, and therefore, filing EEOC charges (or 
participating in another person’s EEO proceeding) requires the utmost 
protection.344 Cases that have addressed this issue will now be 
addressed. 
One court to rely on this argument was the court in the seminal 
case of Pettway.345 In Pettway, the court relied heavily on Title VII’s 
 
 341. See, e.g., Glover, 170 F.3d at 414. 
 342. Id. at 414–15. 
 343. In addition to the cases that will be discussed in this Section, the EEOC, in an earlier 
version of its Compliance Manual, also expressed concern that limiting the participation clause 
would frustrate Congress’s intent by deterring employees from asserting claims. See U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(C)(2) (1998) (“[P]ermit[ting] 
an employer to retaliate against a charging party based on its unilateral determination that the 
charge was unreasonable or otherwise unjustified would chill the rights of all individuals protected 
by the anti-discrimination statutes.”). 
 344. See infra remaining discussion in Section IV.D. 
 345. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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function and structure when deciding the plaintiff’s false and 
defamatory statements were protected.346 The court stated: 
This is particularly required under the machinery set up by 
Title VII. Unlike so many Governmental structures in 
administrative law, EEOC is an administrative agency 
without the power of enforcement. . . . The burden of 
enforcement rests on the individual through his suit in 
Federal District Court. But charges must first have been filed 
with EEOC. Consequently, the filing of charges and the 
giving of information by employees is essential to the 
Commission’s administration of Title VII, the carrying out 
of the congressional policy embodied in the Act and the 
invocation of the sole sanction of Court compulsion through 
employee instituted suit. . . . This is often the only way that 
such issues can be raised—by an individual drafting his 
charge as best he can without expert legal advice. This 
activity, essential as it is, must be protected.347 
The court then noted a protected activity would acquire a 
“precarious status” if employees filing EEOC charges could be fired 
for doing so.348 The court emphasized the broad protection needed for 
“those who seek the benefit of statutes designed by Congress to 
equalize employer and employee in matters of employment.”349 In 
wrapping up this point, the court concluded the balance weighs in 
favor of protecting these charges: 
Congress . . . sought to evaluate and balance the competing 
interests. On the one hand is the protection of the employer 
from damage caused by maliciously libelous statements and 
on the other is protection of the employee from racial and 
other discrimination. In Title VII Congress sought to protect 
the employer’s interest by directing that EEOC proceedings 
be confidential and by imposing severe sanctions against 
unauthorized disclosure. The balance is therefore struck in 
 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. (footnote omitted). The court in Pettway also stated the following regarding the anti-
retaliation provision’s purpose: “[I]t is to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by 
Congress to protect his rights. The Act will be frustrated if the employer may unilaterally determine 
the truth or falsity of charges and take independent action.” Id. 
 348. Id. The court did refer to “innocent” employees, perhaps suggesting employees who 
knowingly engage in false participation activity deserve less protection. Id. 
 349. Id. at 1006. 
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favor of the employee in order to afford him the enunciated 
protection from invidious discrimination, by protecting his 
right to file charges.350 
As a result, the court provided protection to the employee in 
Pettway.351 And, as has been discussed, many courts have relied on 
Pettway when defending an employee’s right to file EEOC charges (or 
engage in other participation activity) regardless of the substance of 
the employee’s allegations.352 
Other courts have also addressed how protecting even 
unreasonable participation is consistent with Title VII and the 
procedure Congress established for enforcing it. For example, the 
Fourth Circuit in Glover stated that adopting a broad interpretation of 
the participation clause would be consistent with the goal of 
“[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial 
mechanisms.”353 The court noted broad protections for participation 
are warranted because they “ensure not only that employers cannot 
intimidate their employees into foregoing the Title VII grievance 
process, but also that [EEOC] investigators will have access to the 
unchilled testimony of witness.”354 The court also noted participation 
was “essential to the machinery set up by Title VII,”355 and that a 
witness would “surely be less than forth-coming”356 “[i]f a witness in 
a Title VII proceeding were secure from retaliation only when her 
testimony met some slippery reasonableness standard.”357 Finally, the 
court recognized that to further Congress’s intent, “some irrelevant 
 
 350. Id. at 1007 (citation omitted). 
 351. Id. 
 352. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175 
(11th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with Pettway regarding the broad scope of the participation clause and 
noting that providing broader protection to participation activity is consistent with the 
congressional purpose behind Title VII), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 353. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Robinson v. Shell 
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th Cir. 
1998)). 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. This case involved a plaintiff who alleged retaliation based on testimony she gave in 
another employee’s EEO proceeding; nonetheless, this activity and filing EEOC charges both fall 
under the participation clause. See id. at 412–13; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018). 
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and even provocative testimony must be immunized so that Title VII 
proceedings will not be chilled.”358 
A United States District Court, relying on dicta from the D.C. 
Circuit, also noted that protecting the substance of EEOC charges was 
important to further the purpose for which Congress established the 
EEOC.359 The court in Egei noted the following: 
The obvious concern of Congress, in both the opposition and 
participation clauses, was to protect the employee who dares 
to speak out against his employer’s hiring practices. The 
enforcement scheme Congress chose for Title VII relies 
heavily on the initiative of aggrieved employees, whose 
efforts in the public interest would be severely chilled if they 
bore the risk of discharge whenever they were unable to 
establish conclusively the merits of their claims.360 
Later, the court expressed concern over how a strict interpretation 
of the participation clause would chill employee complaints and 
frustrate Title VII’s remedial scheme.361 First noting that broad 
protection is “consistent with the remedial purpose”362 behind Title 
VII, the court then stated, “[a]ctivities under the participation clause 
are essential to the machinery set up by Title VII.”363 The court 
wrapped up its discussion regarding this issue by noting that 
participation activities “would be chilled, and Title VII’s scheme 
frustrated, if employees’ bore the risk of discharge whenever they 
were unable to establish conclusively the merits of their claims.’”364 
 
 358. Glover, 170 F.3d at 414. As noted earlier, the court rejected a reasonableness standard also 
because it would lead to a “morass of collateral litigation” and a waste of judicial resources. Id. at 
415. 
 359. Egei v. Johnson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 81, 89 (D.D.C. 2016). The District of Columbia Circuit’s 
opinion to which the district court referred was Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 652 F.2d 
1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 360. Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 89. 
 361. Id. at 89–90. 
 362. Id. at 89. 
 363. Id. (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th Cir. 
1998)); see also Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Activities under 
the participation clause are essential to the machinery set up by Title VII. As such, the scope of 
protection for activity falling under the participation clause is broader than for activity falling under 
the opposition clause.” (quoting Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259 n.4)). 
 364. Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 89–90 (quoting Parker, 652 F.2d at 1019). The court distinguished 
between good-faith but mistaken claims and false claims, but it noted that absent an employee’s 
admission that he filed a knowingly false claim, the risk of chilling employee testimony existed. 
Id. at 90. The court stated: “It would be cold comfort for claimants if they were nominally protected 
from adverse action on the basis of their testimony, but only to the extent that a judge, an ALJ, or 
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Thus, the court in Egei was concerned about the chilling effect 
not protecting all statements made to the EEOC would have, and 
therefore, the participation clause should provide very broad 
protection.365 The court, like the courts described earlier, believed 
Title VII’s purpose of eliminating workplace discrimination (and the 
structure it created to enforce Title VII) would be frustrated if the court 
adopted a more narrow interpretation of the participation clause.366 
Not all courts agree that Title VII’s purpose and/or structure 
supports protecting employees who knowingly engage in false 
participation activities, and courts could rely on those arguments 
should they feel uncomfortable protecting false and malicious 
participation activity. The Seventh Circuit in Mattson, in concluding 
false and malicious claims are not protected, noted the following 
regarding Title VII: 
Title VII was designed to protect the rights of employees who 
in good faith protest the discrimination they believe they 
have suffered and to ensure that such employees remain free 
from reprisals or retaliatory conduct. Title VII was not 
designed to “arm employees with a tactical coercive weapon” 
under which employees can make baseless claims simply to 
“advance their own retaliatory motives and strategies.”367 
As a result of this reasoning, the court adopted an “utterly 
baseless” standard for determining whether an employee engages in 
protected participation conduct, which is the same approach the court 
used when evaluating opposition conduct.368 Thus, the court ignored 
 
even an employer concludes in ‘good faith’ that such testimony was false or malicious.” Id. The 
court later stated it was not condoning lying or minimizing the effect such activity has on the 
administrative process, but it concluded the risk of chilling participation would be too great if it 
adopted a restrictive view of the participation clause. Id. Toward the end of the opinion, the court 
again addressed this when it stated that the case did not address an employee who admitted to 
making false or malicious statements, and that its holding was limited to situations where an 
employee asserts the truth of the issue and the employer disbelieves him. Id. at 90–91. 
 365. Id. at 90. 
 366. Id. at 89–90; see also Calhoun v. EPS Corp., No. 13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 12799080, at *4 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014) (“If this were an opposition case, the result might be different. But 
because the anti-discrimination laws grant near-absolute protection to participation activity, the 
Court cannot abide this result. Doing so would discourage employees from filing legitimate 
discrimination complaints and undermine the anti-discrimination regime.” (emphasis added)). 
 367. Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Spadola v. N.Y.C. 
Transit Auth., 242 F. Supp. 2d 284, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 
619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2010) (relying on Mattson to conclude that the participation clause does 
not provide absolute protection). 
 368. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891. 
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the distinction most courts make, which is that the participation clause 
provides more protection than the opposition clause.369 In fact, the 
court noted providing more protection under the participation clause 
would simply lead to employees filing more EEOC charges (rather 
than filing only internal complaints), which the court viewed as an 
abuse of Title VII and its procedures.370 Thus, if a court does not want 
to protect employees who knowingly engage in false participation 
activities, it could utilize the Mattson argument that doing so would 
frustrate, rather than further, Congressional intent. 
As this Section has demonstrated, some courts believe providing 
very broad protection for participation activities is consistent with 
Title VII and with the process Congress established for enforcing it, 
while other courts have decided such broad protection would frustrate 
Congress’s goals. This dispute is similar to the other disputes 
regarding the reasons courts might/do not have to protect false charges 
or false testimony, in that some courts have decided one way while 
other courts have decided the other.371 Unless Congress acts to clarify 
the participation clause’s scope, or unless the Supreme Court decides 
to address this issue, there will continue to be confusion regarding the 
scope of the participation clause’s protection. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
For Title VII to effectively eradicate workplace discrimination, 
employees must feel free to raise Title VII concerns with their 
employers and with the EEOC. This is why Congress included an anti-
 
 369. See id.; see also Hatmaker, 619 F.3d at 746 (relying on Mattson to note that providing 
such broad protection would “encourage the abuse of Title VII and the proceedings that it 
established”). 
 370. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891; see also Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 977 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (deciding false and malicious statements are protected, the court acknowledged 
the following: “To extend the statute’s protection to malicious claims runs the obvious risk of 
licensing, if not encouraging, bad faith discrimination claims by trouble-making, obstructionist 
employees bent upon harassment. Could Congress, one wonders, really have had this in mind?”). 
 371. One other reason some courts have used when granting broad protection is that the target 
of the false statements might be able to pursue other remedies. For example, Pettway addressed this 
possibility of alternative remedies for employers. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 
1007 n.22 (5th Cir. 1969). Specifically, the court stated that it “in no way impl[ied] that an employer 
is preempted . . . from vindicating his reputation through resort to a civil action for malicious 
defamation.” Id. The court in Booth also acknowledged potential remedies for targets of defamatory 
charges. Booth v. Pasco Cnty., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1201 n.20 (M.D. Fla. 2011). The court stated: 
“[f]or example, the filing of a defamatory charge may enable an employer to sue that employee for 
defamation. In addition, a defendant may be awarded attorney’s fees and other costs for 
successfully defending a frivolous action.” Id. 
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retaliation provision that protects employees who oppose unlawful 
employment practices and who participate in the process Congress 
established for vindicating Title VII’s substantive rights. While both 
activities are protected, it remains unclear how broad that protection 
is under the participation clause. Specifically, courts disagree whether 
knowingly engaging in false participation activities is protected 
conduct. 
Although it might seem distasteful to protect employees who 
knowingly engage in false participation activities,372 there are reasons 
why protecting these activities might be necessary. First, the 
participation clause’s language contains no qualifiers, but rather it 
protects individuals who participate “in any manner” in an EEO 
proceeding. Second, the EEOC, which is responsible for administering 
Title VII, has determined participation activities must be protected, 
regardless of whether they are reasonable or true. Third, despite what 
some employers argue, providing protection will not allow bad 
employees to gain workplace tenure; if they are not good employees, 
employers can still terminate them. Finally, placing limits on 
participation activities is inconsistent with Congressional intent 
because a heightened standard for protection would dissuade 
employees from bringing legitimate Title VII claims and/or testifying 
in others’ EEO proceedings. As a result of these reasons, when 
deciding whether to protect deceptive employees, several courts have 
tipped the scales in favor of doing so. 
Although Congress has not amended Title VII in many years, if 
it wants to deny protection for employees who knowingly engage in 
false participation activity, it should amend Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision and limit its protection to employees who either oppose or 
participate only if those actions are based on a reasonable, good-faith 
belief the employer has engaged in unlawful conduct. Of course, the 
Supreme Court could also decide whether its Breeden opinion, which 
utilized a reasonable, good-faith-belief test in an opposition case, 
should apply to participation cases as well. Until then, however, it 
seems the scope of Title VII’s participation clause will continue to be 




 372. See supra note 9. 
